United States v. Felix Booker
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17716
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Felix Booker was arrested during a traffic stop, handcuffed, and later strip-searched at the county detention facility after officers suspected he was concealing contraband in his rectum.
- Deputies transported Booker, naked and shackled under a blanket, to an emergency room; officers informed ER physician Dr. Michael LaPaglia of their suspicion that Booker had drugs in his rectum.
- Booker refused a digital rectal examination; LaPaglia nonetheless attempted an exam, ordered sedatives, then administered paralytic drugs and intubated Booker without his consent, after which he removed a >5‑gram rock of crack cocaine and turned it over to police.
- Booker moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds; the district court denied the motion and a jury convicted him of possession with intent to distribute.
- The Sixth Circuit majority held that (1) LaPaglia’s invasive, unconsented procedures were attributable to the state because police brought Booker to the doctor, knew what would happen, and stood by, and (2) the forced intubation, paralysis, and rectal examination were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and equivalent to the conduct condemned in Rochin.
- The court vacated Booker’s conviction and remanded; Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing the record does not show the doctor was a state actor and officers reasonably relied on medical judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the physician’s unconsented invasive procedure is state action for Fourth Amendment purposes | Police used doctor as instrument; Booker was in police custody, officers knew what doctor would do and knew Booker refused, so doctor’s conduct is attributable to state | Doctor acted independently for medical reasons; officers merely sought medical care and did not instigate an unlawful search | Held: Yes. Doctor’s actions imputed to state because of custody, police knowledge/participation, and foreseeability that such invasive acts lacked lawful authority without consent |
| Whether the forced intubation, paralysis, and digital rectal exam were reasonable searches | The procedures were invasive, nonconsensual, and shocking to the conscience — akin to forced stomach pumping in Rochin; less intrusive alternatives existed | Procedure was medical and intended to prevent life‑threatening drug absorption; risks were routine and reasonable under exigent‑medical‑care rationale | Held: Unreasonable. The intrusion violated the Fourth Amendment (drawing on Rochin and Winston v. Lee) and could have been avoided by less intrusive means or a court order |
| Whether suppression of the evidence is required (exclusionary rule) | Officers’ conduct was deliberate/reckless and recurring; exclusion will deter similar constitutional violations | Evidence obtained by a physician acting independently should not necessarily trigger exclusion; civil/disciplinary remedies for doctors suffice | Held: Exclusion appropriate. Officer culpability and recurring conduct justify applying the exclusionary rule |
| Standard for imputing private medical conduct to government when doctor claims independent medical motive | If private actor’s motive is illegitimate or police instigated/participated, conduct imputes to state; presence and acquiescence can convert private action into state action | Private medical motivation can be legitimate; unless police directed or knew of bad faith, conduct is private | Held: Private motive does not immunize conduct when police knowingly bring a suspect in custody to a doctor, stand by, and a reasonable officer would know the doctor lacked lawful authority to perform the invasive, nonconsensual procedure |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (Fourth Amendment inapplicable to private searches absent government participation)
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (degree of government participation determines when private conduct is state action)
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (state‑action inquiry depends on all circumstances and government participation)
- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced stomach pumping shocks the conscience and violates due process)
- Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (compulsory surgery/anesthesia for evidence is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (circumstances where compelled blood tests are reasonable)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (connects conscience‑shocking due process analysis to Fourth Amendment reasonableness)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (exclusionary rule aimed at deterring sufficiently culpable police misconduct)
- United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985) (private actor handing contraband to authorities not necessarily state action)
- United States v. Howard, 752 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1985) (private investigator’s independent motives can preclude state action)
- United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2008) (apartment manager became government agent when officers requested entry and emergency exception did not apply)
- United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1990) (private medical testing consented to by suspect did not trigger Fourth Amendment review)