United States v. Fathia-Anna Davis
855 F.3d 587
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Davis arranged for the murder of her ex-husband, Jodi, contacting two undercover CMPD detectives whom she believed were killers; she met them multiple times, used her car and several cellphones, and paid $4,000 after being told (falsely) the murder had been completed.
- Prior to the undercover operation, Davis had attempted to poison Jodi with Ambien while married; after their divorce she sought someone to kill him and asked friend Huy Nguyen to help.
- Nguyen informed police and, at officers’ request, sent Davis a text saying he had found someone; that led to meetings with undercover detectives who used unmarked vehicles and covert communications.
- Davis met with detectives three times (showing photos, giving address, negotiating price), paid $500 down and later $3,500 after being told Jodi was killed; police then arrested her and recovered phones.
- She was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce to commit murder for hire) and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months; she appealed, arguing (1) manufactured jurisdiction and (2) an unreasonable sentence driven by guideline application.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine bars the § 1958 charge | The government manufactured the interstate-commerce element by directing Nguyen to text Davis, so federal jurisdiction was created solely by government conduct | Government: even if Nguyen’s text originated from police instruction, the record shows Davis thereafter voluntarily used phones and a car repeatedly — sufficient independent interstate-facility use | Court: No relief. Doctrine applies only when government supplied the sole interstate element; here record is silent as to improper intent and Davis independently used phones/automobile to advance the scheme, so conviction stands |
| Whether the guidelines calculation and resulting 120-month guideline sentence were improper | The cross-reference to § 2A1.5 and resulting base offense level (leading to the 120-month guideline cap) produces a disproportionate, perverse result and denied individualized sentencing | Government: Court correctly calculated guidelines and applied statutory cap; guidelines are the required starting point and defendant could seek a variance | Court: No plain error. Guidelines were correctly calculated and applied; court considered mitigating evidence and § 3553(a) factors and reasonably imposed 120 months |
| Whether the district court abused discretion in refusing a downward variance | Davis urged mitigating factors and personal circumstances warranting time served (~8 months) | Government urged maximum sentence for deterrence and public protection | Court: No abuse. Court provided specific reasons (prior attempts, lack of acceptance of responsibility, dangerousness) for denying variance and imposing 10 years |
| Whether plain-error review applies to the guideline challenge | Davis contends substantive unreasonableness tied to guideline structure; she did not raise the technical guideline argument below | Government: Failure to raise issue in district court limits review; any error is not plain | Held: Plain-error standard applies and requirements are not met — no clear or obvious error shown |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Coates, 949 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991) (manufactured-jurisdiction refusal where government agent made interstate call solely to create federal element)
- United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (Travel Act dismissal where federal agent supplied interstate element to federalize local crime)
- United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1985) (government may not manufacture jurisdiction by contrived interstate activity by agents)
- United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (declined manufactured-jurisdiction defense where record lacked evidence of improper purpose)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (incorrect Guidelines calculation is a significant procedural error)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines are the starting point and initial benchmark for sentencing)