United States v. Ezralee Kelley, 962 F.3d 470

Background

In 2007 Kelley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (crack); the offense involved a mixture of 262.2 grams (162.5 g of cocaine base).
The PSR applied the 2006 Guidelines and treated Kelley as a career offender based on two prior Washington drug convictions, yielding a Guidelines range of 262–327 months; the district court imposed 192 months (below Guidelines but within the plea-agreement range).
Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act (2010) changing crack cocaine quantity thresholds, and later the First Step Act § 404 (2018) authorized courts to "impose a reduced sentence as if" the Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2–3 were in effect when the covered offense was committed.
Kelley moved under the First Step Act, arguing (1) the Fair Sentencing Act would lower her statutory and Guidelines ranges and (2) intervening Ninth Circuit precedent (United States v. Brown) means her Washington convictions no longer qualify as career-offender predicates, which would substantially reduce her Guidelines range and require immediate release.
The district court declined to conduct a plenary resentencing; it recalculated Kelley's Guidelines only by inserting the Fair Sentencing Act into the legal landscape as of the time of the offense (but not other intervening changes) and reduced her term to 180 months. Kelley appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Kelley)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether the First Step Act authorizes a plenary resentencing that reconsiders all aspects of the original sentence (including intervening case law on career-offender predicates).	First Step Act permits courts to "impose" a reduced sentence, which requires full resentencing and recalculation of Guidelines under current law (including Brown), so her career-offender status must be reconsidered.	First Step Act allows only a limited, counterfactual inquiry: apply the law as it existed at the time of the offense, altering only by adding Fair Sentencing Act §§ 2–3; it does not authorize reopening other sentencing determinations or applying later case law.	Held: First Step Act does not permit plenary resentencing; courts must place themselves in the counterfactual legal regime at the time of the offense, altering only by §§ 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, and then may exercise discretion to reduce the sentence.
Whether § 3582(c) or the use of the word "impose" in the First Step Act requires plenary resentencing.	§ 3582(c)(1)(B) and the verb "impose" imply Congress intended a full resentencing when authorizing a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.	§ 3582(c)(1)(B) is merely a general authorization to implement statutes that permit sentence modification; the First Step Act is its own, specific grant and its text limits the scope to the Fair Sentencing Act changes. Dillon v. United States supports a limited, non-plenary approach.	Held: § 3582(c)(1)(B) does not transform the First Step Act into authorization for plenary resentencing; the statute's text controls and limits the inquiry.

Key Cases Cited

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act applied to post-enactment sentences and explains scope of Act's retroactivity).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts should begin sentencing by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range).
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes only limited adjustments, not plenary resentencing).
United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (Washington drug-conspiracy statute is not a "controlled substance offense" for career-offender purposes).
United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act permits limited counterfactual inquiry—do not conduct plenary resentencing).
United States v. Smith, 958 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2020) (same interpretation as Hegwood).
United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020) (contrary view: courts may consider some intervening case law when recalculating under the First Step Act).