United States v. Eugene Jackson, 36 F.4th 1294

Background:

Defendant Eugene Jackson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); the possession occurred on September 26, 2017.
Probation attributed five prior predicates to Jackson, including two cocaine-related Florida convictions (1998 and 2004) under Fla. Stat. § 893.13, and at least two violent-felony convictions; the PSR recommended ACCA enhancement producing a 15-year mandatory minimum.
Jackson conceded two violent predicates but contested that his cocaine convictions were ACCA "serious drug offense[s]," arguing they could have involved ioflupane, which was not a federal "controlled substance" at the time of his 2017 firearm offense.
The district court applied the ACCA enhancement; Jackson appealed, arguing that due-process fair‑notice requires using the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) schedules in effect when he committed the federal offense.
The Eleventh Circuit held that fair‑notice/due‑process requires applying the CSA schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm possession, concluded Jackson’s cocaine convictions could have involved ioflupane and thus did not necessarily involve a federally defined "controlled substance," vacated the ACCA sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

Issues:

Issue	Jackson's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Which version of the CSA schedules governs ACCA’s definition of "serious drug offense"—the schedule in effect at the time of the prior state convictions or the schedule in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?	The schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm possession should govern (fair notice requires the defendant know the federal penalty exposure at the time of the federal offense).	Prior decisions (Smith/Shular) and traditional backward-looking treatment of prior convictions support treating state convictions as satisfying ACCA.	Apply the CSA schedules in effect when the defendant committed the federal firearm offense (fair‑notice/due‑process rationale).
Whether Jackson’s 1998 and 2004 Florida cocaine convictions qualify as ACCA "serious drug offense[s]" because Florida’s statutory category then included ioflupane.	They do not qualify because, although Florida’s statute could encompass ioflupane at the time of conviction, ioflupane was not a federally controlled substance when Jackson possessed the firearm; under the categorical approach the convictions could rest on ioflupane only.	The convictions qualify as "serious drug offenses" (relying on circuit precedent and Shular).	They do not qualify: under the categorical approach and using the CSA schedules effective at the time of the federal offense, the least conduct criminalized could be sale/PWI of ioflupane, which was not a federal controlled substance in 2017, so the convictions do not "necessarily entail" conduct meeting ACCA’s definition.
Whether prior precedents (United States v. Smith decisions, Shular, McNeill) bind the court to count these convictions as ACCA predicates despite the schedule‑timing issue.	Smith/Shular/McNeill do not control this timing question; their holdings assumed other criteria met and did not address which federal schedule should govern.	These precedents require treating Fla. Stat. § 893.13 convictions as ACCA predicates.	The court held those cases do not bind the panel on the schedule‑version question; Shular’s test ("necessarily entail") supports rejecting ACCA coverage here, and McNeill’s backward‑looking rule does not dictate the timing for which federal standard to apply.

Key Cases Cited

Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (use categorical test asking whether state offense's elements "necessarily entail" conduct in ACCA definition)
United States v. McNeill, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) (prior state‑law offense elements are evaluated as they existed at time of the state conviction)
United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressed mens rea issue under Fla. § 893.13 for ACCA analysis)
United States v. Smith, 983 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) (applied Shular to hold § 893.13 qualifies despite lack of mens rea element)
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (distinguishes elements from means; governs categorical/divisible‑statute analysis)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (due‑process/fair‑notice principles for criminal statutes)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (authorizes limited documentary inquiry when statute is divisible)
United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) (de novo standard and reliance on federal law for ACCA interpretation)