United States v. Errol King
853 F.3d 267
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2002 King was convicted in Ohio on multiple robbery/kidnapping charges arising "on or about" February 18, 2002; three indictments lacked times/locations but bills of particulars specified times/places about 25 minutes and different locations apart.
- Plea colloquy transcripts are unavailable; journal entries for the guilty pleas do not state times or locations.
- In 2015 King pleaded guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The Government sought ACCA enhancement (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on King’s 2002 convictions, which would trigger a 15-year mandatory minimum if the prior violent felonies were "committed on occasions different from one another."
- King argued the district court could not rely on the Ohio bills of particulars under the Taylor/Shepard evidentiary limits and therefore the Government failed to prove three convictions occurred on different occasions.
- The district court relied on Thomas (6th Cir.) to consider the bills of particulars, found the prior convictions occurred on different occasions, and imposed an ACCA sentence; King appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (King) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sentencing court determining if prior offenses were "committed on occasions different from one another" is limited to the Taylor/Shepard evidentiary sources | Taylor and Shepard limit the court to plea transcripts, plea agreements, charging documents or comparable judicial records that show what the defendant necessarily admitted or what the jury necessarily found | Taylor/Shepard limits apply only to the predicate-elements inquiry, not the different-occasions inquiry; alternatively, the bills of particulars qualify as Shepard-approved or, on the record, the indictments/journal entries suffice | The Taylor/Shepard evidentiary constraints do apply to the different-occasions inquiry; district court erred by relying on the bills of particulars which were not Shepard-approved |
| Whether the Ohio bills of particulars are Shepard-approved sources for establishing times/locations of prior offenses | Bills of particulars are not Shepard-approved because times/locations are not elements and King did not necessarily admit them at plea | Bills of particulars are part of the charging documents and may be considered; alternatively other record parts suffice to show separate occasions | The bills of particulars were not Shepard-approved here; no record shows King necessarily admitted time/place, so the district court should not have relied on them |
| Whether, limited to Shepard-approved materials (indictments and journal entries), the Government proved three distinct occasions | Records do not show separate occasions for all three convictions; at most two occasions are shown | Even considering only indictments/journal entries, common-sense reading supports distinct occasions (Government claims) | Under Shepard-limited record, Government failed to meet its burden to show three different occasions; ACCA enhancement improper |
| Whether prior Sixth Circuit precedent (Thomas/Burgin) precludes applying Taylor/Shepard here | Shepard and later Supreme Court decisions abrogate Thomas to the extent it conflicts; Burgin did not foreclose applying Taylor/Shepard constraints | Thomas and Burgin support broader evidentiary use by sentencing courts | Shepard/Descamps/Mathis justify departing from Thomas; Burgin remains compatible when read as allowing the inquiry but not broader evidentiary methods; panel follows Supreme Court guidance |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical and modified-categorical approaches and limits factual inquiry at sentencing)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (restricts evidentiary sources for plea-based prior convictions to charging documents, plea agreements/colloquies, or comparable records)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (reinforces Sixth Amendment concerns; limits judge factfinding beyond elements)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (principle that any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by a jury)
- Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (discusses jury role and factfinding relevant to sentencing enhancements)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (addressed Taylor’s scope in civil immigration context; distinguished here because constitutional criminal-trial protections differ)