United States v. Eron Yanes-Cruz, 634 F. App'x 247

Defendant Eron Yanes-Cruz, a Mexican national, was convicted in Georgia (2010) of battery under Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(a) and later deported; he reentered the U.S. and pled guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),(b)(2).
The PSR applied an 8-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because the Georgia battery conviction was treated as an "aggravated felony" (a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16).
Yanes-Cruz objected that the Georgia battery statute does not categorically qualify as a "crime of violence;" the district court overruled the objection.
With acceptance credit and a 3-level reduction, his total offense level produced an 18–24 month advisory Guidelines range; the district court varied downward and imposed 16 months' imprisonment, crediting time in ICE custody.
Yanes-Cruz appealed both the application of the § 2L1.2 enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of the 16-month sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(a) (battery causing "substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm") is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and thus an "aggravated felony" for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).	Yanes-Cruz: the battery statute does not necessarily require violent physical force and thus does not categorically match § 16.	Government: the statute requires "substantial" or "visible" bodily harm, which necessarily involves the use of physical force and therefore satisfies § 16.	The Court held the Georgia battery statute qualifies as a "crime of violence," so the § 2L1.2 enhancement was properly applied.
Whether the 16-month sentence (below the 18–24 mo. guideline range) is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).	Yanes-Cruz: a lower or time-served sentence was warranted given mitigation and circumstances.	Government/District Court: district court reasonably weighed § 3553(a) factors, including deterrence and multiple illegal reentries, justifying the chosen variance.	The Court held the sentence was not substantively unreasonable and affirmed.

Hernandez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 513 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2008) (Georgia simple battery requires physical contact causing pain/injury and qualifies as a crime of violence)
United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006) (physical contact can satisfy the "use of physical force" element)
United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining categorical approach for § 16 analysis)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting "physical force" in the ACCA context as "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (holding that causing bodily injury satisfies the "physical force" element for certain federal provisions)