966 F.3d 237
3rd Cir.2020Background
- Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting conspiracy (Class D felony); sentenced to 30 months imprisonment + 36 months supervised release.
- He repeatedly violated supervised release (bought heroin, tested positive, left residential reentry center); probation filed petitions and sought revocation.
- Probation calculated a revocation range of 21–27 months; statutory cap under §3583(e)(3) for a Class D felony limited imprisonment on revocation to 24 months.
- Seighman argued any revocation term that, when aggregated with time already served, exceeded the original statutory maximum would trigger the Apprendi/ Haymond jury-right rule.
- District Court found possession by a preponderance, revoked supervised release, and imposed 24 months; it rejected Seighman’s Haymond-based challenge, noting Haymond was limited to §3583(k).
- Seighman appealed, arguing §3583(g)’s mandatory-revocation provision is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; appellate review was for plain error because the argument was not raised below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §3583(g)’s mandatory revocation for drug possession (one-day minimum) violates the jury trial and due process principles articulated in Haymond/Alleyne | §3583(g) is like §3583(k); it mandates imprisonment based on judge-found facts and so must yield to the jury-right rule | §3583(g) differs materially from (k): it covers noncriminal conduct too, imposes only a one-day mandatory term, and the maximum revocation term is capped by the original-offense class under §3583(e)(3) | Court upheld §3583(g); Haymond limited to §3583(k) and (g) is more like ordinary revocation, not a new-punishment regime requiring jury findings |
| Whether Apprendi or aggregation of revocation terms converts revocation into increase of the original sentence requiring jury findings | Aggregating time served plus revocation could exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, triggering Apprendi | Revocation terms (except §3583(k)) are part of penalty for the original offense and do not increase the statutory maximum such that Apprendi applies | Court rejected aggregation-Apprendi argument, following precedent that supervised-release revocations are penalties for initial conviction and not subject to Apprendi |
| Whether plain error relief is available given the issue wasn’t raised below | The error was plain under Haymond and affected substantial rights | Any error was not plainly established; defendant received the statutory maximum revocation term and thus substantial rights were not impaired | Court held review under Olano fails; no plain error and substantial rights not affected given 24-month sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality struck down §3583(k) under Alleyne; Breyer concurrence provided controlling narrow ground)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimum must be submitted to a jury)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (narrowest-concurrence rule for determining controlling opinion)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (revocation of supervised release is part of penalty for the initial offense)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error review framework)
- United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejection of Apprendi aggregation argument for supervised-release revocations)