926 F.3d 309
6th Cir.2019Background
- Eric Ruska committed multiple sexual assaults and kidnappings across several years; earlier state convictions included a 2002 conviction under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84 (assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder) and later convictions for criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping.
- The federal prosecution charged Ruska for offenses committed in federal territorial jurisdiction (Hiawatha National Forest); he pleaded guilty to kidnapping and three counts of sexual abuse.
- The district court imposed life sentences on each count, citing three alternative bases: (1) mandatory life under the federal "three strikes" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c); (2) an upward Guidelines departure; and (3) an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
- On appeal Ruska challenged only the district court’s application of the three strikes statute, arguing his 2002 Michigan conviction (§ 750.84) did not qualify as a “serious violent felony” under the statute’s elements clause and that the statute’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Sessions v. Dimaya.
- The Sixth Circuit applied the categorical approach, held that § 750.84 has as an element the use/threat of the Johnson I definition of "violent force," and therefore qualifies as a strike under § 3559(c).
- The court avoided deciding the residual-clause vagueness claim and noted any error in applying the three strikes statute would be harmless because the district court would have imposed life under its alternative grounds, which Ruska did not challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ruska) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84 qualifies under § 3559(c) elements clause | § 750.84 does not require the use/attempted use/threatened use of the Johnson I "violent force" (at most slight force) | § 750.84 includes the type of force required by Johnson I and thus qualifies as a "serious violent felony" | § 750.84 satisfies the elements clause; counts as a strike under § 3559(c) |
| Whether the residual clause of § 3559(c) is unconstitutionally vague post-Dimaya | Residual clause is vague under Sessions v. Dimaya and thus cannot be used to categorize prior convictions as strikes | Government did not need to reach residual clause because elements clause sufficed | Court did not decide the constitutional challenge to the residual clause (avoided) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("violent force" means force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (residual clause of federal statute found unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (interpreting "physical force" in a misdemeanor-domestic-violence context)
- Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84 qualifies as a crime of violence under an elements clause)
- United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing use of the categorical approach)