United States v. Eric Jermaine Spivey
861 F.3d 1207
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Austin and Spivey reported two burglaries of their Lauderhill, FL home; the burglar (Hunt) was caught and told police the house contained evidence of credit-card fraud.
- Two task-force officers (a Secret Service special agent and a local detective) visited the home posing as burglary investigators; the special agent pretended to be a crime‑scene technician and dusted for prints.
- Austin invited the officers inside and led them through rooms on the burglar’s path; officers observed a card‑embossing machine, stacks of cards, and expensive merchandise in plain view.
- Austin was arrested on an unrelated outstanding warrant; after the ruse was revealed to Spivey, he signed written consent forms for a full search and for searches of electronic devices.
- The subsequent search recovered drugs, a loaded firearm, dozens of counterfeit cards, and device‑making equipment; both defendants moved to suppress evidence as the consent was induced by deception.
- The district court denied suppression, finding Austin’s initial consent voluntary (and alternatively that Spivey’s written consent cured any defect); defendants pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the suppression denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent obtained after officers used a deceptive ruse was voluntary under the Fourth Amendment | Austin: consent was induced by deception about officers’ identity/purpose and thus involuntary | Government: deception was minor, officers had a legitimate reason to be there, and totality of circumstances shows voluntary consent | Consent was voluntary; district court did not clearly err; suppression denied and convictions affirmed |
| Whether officers claiming a burglary investigation (when their main purpose was fraud) vitiates consent | Austin: pretextual purpose misled her into cooperating as a victim, not a suspect | Government: subjective intent irrelevant; burglary follow‑up was a legitimate reason and the suspect’s perspective controls | Pretext alone did not invalidate consent; what mattered was Austin’s knowledge and behavior |
| Whether officer misrepresenting identity/role (Secret Service agent posing as crime‑scene tech) invalidates consent | Austin: misrepresentation of authority was material and caused her to allow access to private areas | Government: identity/precise title was immaterial; she knew law enforcement was present and ran the risk of discovery | Misrepresentation was not dispositive here; looked to totality and found no coercion |
| Whether later written consent (Spivey) or plain‑view observations cure any earlier defect | Austin: initial deception tainted all subsequent fruit of entry | Government: Spivey’s written consent and plainly visible evidence render suppression unnecessary | Court did not need to decide Spivey’s cure because initial consent was held valid; affirmance rests on voluntariness finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent assessed under totality of circumstances)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (consent is invalid when induced by a false claim of legal authority)
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (police deception does not automatically render statements involuntary under Miranda/Fifth Amendment)
- Wuagneux v. United States, 683 F.2d 1343 (consent knowing risk that civil inquiries may lead to criminal proceedings supports voluntariness)
- United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (consent induced by deceptive omission in administrative/tax context may be involuntary)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (subjective intent of officers is irrelevant when conduct is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment)