United States v. Enrique Saldana
16-2210
| 3rd Cir. | Dec 20, 2017Background
- Enrique Saldana was serving supervised release after a 2010 federal extortion conviction; supervised release began Feb 2014.
- On May 2, 2014 Saldana rushed his incapacitated wife, Jeannette Magras Saldana, to the hospital; she was pronounced dead. Territorial authorities charged him with murder and related counts.
- Probation petitioned to revoke supervised release alleging: (1) commission of another crime, (2) disobeying probation officer instructions (stay away from wife’s residence), and (3) failure to notify change of residence.
- Revocation hearing (Apr 21–22, 2016) featured competing expert testimony: government medical examiner Dr. Landron (Benadryl intoxication; manner homicide; multiple contusions consistent with defensive injuries) and defense pathologist Dr. Pestaner (drug overdose, contributory alcohol/alprazolam; injuries consistent with falls).
- After initial findings and additional testimony (court-ordered production of two lay witnesses), the District Court found by a preponderance that Saldana committed third-degree assault under Virgin Islands law, classified that violation as Grade A and another as Grade C, and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment plus supervised release and community service.
Issues
| Issue | Saldana's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for third-degree assault | Evidence was insufficient to show Saldana committed assault causing serious bodily injury | Circumstantial and expert evidence (timing, injuries, last seen with victim) supports finding by preponderance | Affirmed — preponderance standard met; findings not clearly erroneous (revocation proper) |
| Grade classification (A vs B) | Third-degree assault under VI law is not a "crime of violence" for Grade A | §297(a)(4) requires infliction of serious bodily injury, which involves force capable of causing pain/injury — thus a crime of violence | Affirmed — conduct constitutes a crime of violence; Grade A proper |
| Denial of continuance (timing vis-à-vis criminal trial) | Revocation hearing should have been continued until criminal trial to avoid prejudice and inconsistent findings | Timing is not constitutionally required to be postponed; no substantial impairment shown | Affirmed — denial not an abuse of discretion; no due process violation |
| Denial of continuance (late expert, late discovery) | Late arrival of defense expert and belated discovery prejudiced ability to present defense | Court accommodated by ordering government expert to testify last; defense could still examine and cross-examine | Affirmed — no substantial prejudice; district court acted within discretion |
| Reopening hearing / court-ordered witnesses / judge questioning witnesses | Court improperly reopened, called witnesses, and pursued a theory government did not allege; judge ceased to be neutral | Reopening and judicial questioning clarified testimony; government presented evidence supporting assault theory; court acted to elicit facts, not advocate | Affirmed — reopening and judicial examination permissible; no due process violation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.) (standard of review and preponderance standard for revocation)
- United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir.) (preponderance suffices for revocation; need not prove crime beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force" as violent force causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir.) (application of categorical approach and element-focused inquiry)
- United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.) (in supervised-release context district court may base grade on defendant’s actual conduct)
- United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.) (standard for reviewing denial of continuance and propriety of judicial questioning)