United States v. Emmanuel Robinson
982 F.3d 1181
| 8th Cir. | 2020Background
- Plainclothes detectives approached Davionne Harvey at a used-car lot; Harvey handed a ring of keys to Emmanuel Robinson, who then shoved Harvey, shouted threats, and gestured toward his waistband.
- Detectives ordered Robinson to stop, separated him from Harvey, frisked him, and recovered a handgun from Robinson’s waistband; a records check showed prior felony convictions and Robinson was arrested.
- Robinson moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unlawful Terry stop/frisk; the magistrate and district court denied suppression after an evidentiary hearing.
- At trial the government introduced records of seven prior felony convictions; Robinson sought to testify that he believed his Second Amendment rights had been restored and that Missouri law allowed felons to possess firearms, but the court excluded that testimony as irrelevant to the charged federal offense.
- The district court instructed the jury on the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) but did not instruct that the government must prove Robinson knew he belonged to the category of persons barred from possessing firearms (the Rehaif element); Robinson did not object at trial and declined to testify after the court limited the scope of permissible testimony.
- The jury convicted Robinson; on appeal he challenged (1) the validity of the stop/frisk and (2) the sufficiency of the proceedings under Rehaif v. United States given the omitted instruction and excluded testimony. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Robinson) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of stop and frisk (Terry) | Frisk unlawful: detectives lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion when they separated and frisked Robinson. | Detectives observed an apparent assault plus a waistband motion suggesting he was armed and dangerous, supporting a Terry stop and protective frisk. | Stop and frisk were lawful; detectives had reasonable suspicion to stop and reasonably suspected Robinson was armed. |
| Rehaif instructional error and exclusion of testimony | Court erred by not instructing jury that gov’t must prove Robinson knew he belonged to a prohibited class and by excluding his testimony that he believed his rights were restored; error likely affected outcome. | Even under Rehaif, Robinson’s proffered statements reflect a mistake of law (belief about legality), not lack of knowledge of his status; government proved multiple prior convictions and Robinson offered no evidence his convictions were excepted—any error was harmless. | Omission of Rehaif instruction was plain error but did not affect substantial rights; exclusion of testimony was not prejudicial in context; conviction affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (Government must prove defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to the proscribed category)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Police may stop and frisk on reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (During a stop officers may frisk if they reasonably suspect the person is armed and dangerous)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Frisk justified by specific and articulable facts that suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons)
- United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2009) (Observed misdemeanor conduct can supply reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop)
- United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2003) (Standards for protective frisk under Terry)
- United States v. Williams, 929 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2019) (Whether criminal activity was afoot evaluated objectively)
- Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018) (Plain-error review requires showing a reasonable probability the outcome would differ)
- United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2019) (Rehaif instructional error reviewed for plain error when not raised at trial)
- United States v. Crumble, 965 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2020) (Defendant’s failure to present evidence that he reasonably believed his conviction was excepted under § 921(a)(20) undermines a Rehaif-prejudice claim)
- United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rehaif does not impose a willfulness requirement; ignorance of law is not a defense)
- United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2020) (Post-Rehaif, government must prove defendant knew his status, not that he knew the law made that status unlawful)