United States v. Eli Erickson, 999 F.3d 622

Background

Defendant Eli Erickson (Native American) was convicted by a jury in the District of South Dakota of conspiracy to distribute 500+ grams of methamphetamine and related firearm offenses; sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment.
The Central Division (trial venue) includes multiple Indian reservations and the Census reported ~25% American Indian/Alaska Native population, but no Native Americans served on Erickson’s petit jury.
The district’s master jury wheel is populated from registered voter lists; on the day of selection 9 of 51 qualified jurors identified as Native American, but six were excused for cause and two were removed by government peremptories (Erickson did not challenge those strikes).
Major trial evidence was testimony from Witness C, who said she made ~20 trips from Nebraska in 2015 carrying 1–3 pounds of meth each trip and commonly “fronted” meth to Erickson, supporting both participation and the 500‑gram quantity element; other witnesses described smaller sales.
During trial defense suspected Witness S was intoxicated and asked for a urine test; the court allowed defense to recall S and ask whether he would submit to testing (S refused). After trial Erickson received audio recordings of Witness C’s interviews and moved for a new trial as newly discovered evidence; the district court reviewed recordings in camera and denied relief.

Issues

Issue	Erickson’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Fair‑cross‑section challenge to jury pool	Central Division’s jury pool excluded Native Americans (no Native jurors seated); using voter rolls systematically underrepresents Native Americans	Use of voter registration lists is lawful; Erickson provided no evidence of systematic exclusion from jury pool	Reversed? No — Affirmed. Court held Erickson failed to show (a) the pool underrepresented Native Americans because he produced no data on the wheel, and (b) systematic exclusion from the selection process was not shown
Change of venue/new trial based on for‑cause/peremptory strikes of Native jurors	Many Native potential jurors were struck for cause or by peremptories, demonstrating inability to seat a fair cross section	Erickson agreed to for‑cause strikes, did not contest government’s non‑discriminatory peremptories, and did not request venue change at trial	Denied — district court did not abuse discretion; absence of Native jurors was an anomaly, not cause for venue change
Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy and 500‑gram quantity	Testimony of Witness C was unreliable and insufficient to prove Erickson knowingly joined a conspiracy or that quantity met 500 grams	Witness C’s testimony that she repeatedly transported and fronted multi‑pound quantities to Erickson provided a tacit‑agreement and quantity basis; jury credited her	Affirmed — viewing evidence favorably to verdict, a reasonable jury could convict on conspiracy and quantity
Evidentiary ruling: urine test and scope of cross‑examination of Witness S	Court should have ordered urine test and allowed broader cross‑examination about recent meth use	Court allowed defense to recall S and ask whether he would submit to testing (S said no); further questioning was not requested	No abuse of discretion — court’s handling gave jury relevant impeachment material and limited re‑call was within court’s discretion
Newly discovered evidence (post‑trial audio of Witness C)	Late‑produced audio recordings of Witness C contain material/exculpatory statements that would likely lead to acquittal if used to impeach her testimony	Recordings and summaries were substantially similar; undisclosed differences were impeachment only and not materially exculpatory	Denied — district court found recordings not material (only impeachment); standard for new trial on newly discovered evidence not met

Key Cases Cited

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (Sixth Amendment fair‑cross‑section principle)
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (prima facie test for fair‑cross‑section claims)
Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1996) (jury plans using voter registration lists ordinarily constitutional absent proof of systematic exclusion)
Clifford v. United States, 640 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1981) (use percentage on eligible list to assess fair‑cross‑section claim)
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (examining jury‑pool percentages in fair‑cross‑section analysis)
United States v. Sullivan, 714 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence)
United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2005) (conspiracy can be shown by tacit understanding and circumstantial evidence)
United States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1997) (tacit agreement may be inferred from conduct)
United States v. Shumaker, 866 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2017) (standards for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
United States v. White, 557 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2009) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of evidentiary rulings)