United States v. Edwards
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8831
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- James Edwards pleaded guilty to federal firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); sentencing raised ACCA issues.
- Edwards had four relevant prior Massachusetts convictions: unarmed robbery; assault with a dangerous weapon; distribution of a controlled substance (conceded a serious drug offense); and armed assault with intent to murder.
- The district court treated unarmed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon as violent felonies and used two of those plus the conceded drug conviction to impose the 15-year ACCA mandatory minimum.
- On appeal Edwards contested that his prior convictions qualified as ACCA predicates, focusing on whether armed assault with intent to murder qualifies under ACCA’s elements clause.
- The First Circuit applied the categorical approach, examined the Massachusetts statute (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 18(b)), and affirmed, holding the armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction is an ACCA predicate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Edwards) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an armed-assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" under the elements clause | The Massachusetts assault element can be satisfied by an offensive touching (e.g., spitting, tickling) that lacks "violent force" under Johnson I, so the statute can cover non-violent conduct and thus is not an ACCA predicate | The statute’s additional elements — being armed and specific intent to kill (malice) — make it implausible the conviction could rest on only an offensive-touching theory; the combined elements require force capable of causing physical pain or injury | Held: Qualifies — intent-to-kill plus being armed means the minimum conduct involves force capable of causing physical pain or injury; conviction counts as ACCA predicate |
| Whether indirect means of harming (e.g., poisoning) avoid Johnson I’s "violent force" requirement | Edwards argued hypothetical indirect harms could show intent to murder without Johnson-type physical force | Government relied on precedent recognizing indirect application of force (e.g., poison) as use of force and stressed Massachusetts law requires an armed act and murderous intent | Held: Indirect application (e.g., poisoning) can be physical force; but Massachusetts convictions cited involved direct application and do not show realistic probability of convicting for non-violent offensive-touching with intent to murder |
| Applicability of the categorical approach and whether modified-categorical approach is needed | Edwards did not contest the categorical approach; no modified-categorical approach necessary | Government agreed the categorical approach governs here | Held: Categorical approach applied; no modified-categorical approach needed |
| Whether earlier Massachusetts cases (spraying mace/WD-40) show a realistic probability of non-violent convictions under the § 18(b) statute | Edwards cited those cases to suggest the statute could be applied to assaults that might not meet Johnson force | Government noted those cases involved different crimes (assault by means of a dangerous weapon) and did not show intent-to-kill required by § 18(b) | Held: Those cases are inapposite; they do not demonstrate a realistic probability that § 18(b) would cover merely non-violent offensive-touching with intent to murder |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" as "violent force" capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explains categorical approach to determining statutory elements)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (requires realistic probability, not mere theoretical possibility, when applying categorical approach)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (recognizes that use of force can include indirect applications like poisoning)
- Whindleton v. United States, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2015) (discusses Massachusetts assault and prior First Circuit treatment)
- United States v. Mulkern, 854 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2017) (addresses burden of proof for ACCA predicates — preponderance of the evidence)
- United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016) (holds assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon can qualify as an ACCA violent felony)