United States v. Edward Sullivan
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9800
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Sullivan produced and possessed a sex video involving Erika Doe, a fourteen-year-old, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B).
- Sullivan had prior state convictions for sexual offenses involving minors and was subject to California parole conditions restricting contact with minors and allowing search of devices.
- The video was produced in Vacaville (Eastern District of California) after initial conduct in Berkeley (Northern District of California).
- The district court denied suppression of laptop evidence and Sullivan was convicted after bench trial; the government cross-appealed an obstruction-of-justice guideline issue.
- Sullivan was sentenced to 25 years (§2251(a)) and 10 years (§2252(a)(4)(B)) mandatory minimums, to run concurrently, followed by lifetime supervised release.
- On appeal, the court affirmed some rulings, reversed others, and remanded for resentencing due to an error in applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue for §2251(a) production | Sullivan argues improper venue in the Northern District. | Sullivan contends production occurred in the Eastern District, so venue was wrong. | Venue proper in the Northern District under §3237(a). |
| Constitutionality of applying intrastate video production/possession | §2251(a) and §2252(a)(4)(B) unconstitutional for purely intrastate activity. | Congress may regulate intrastate production/possession as it relates to interstate commerce. | Constitutional as applied; NFIB precedent does not overrule precedents confirming relation to interstate commerce. |
| Suppression of laptop evidence | Unexplained 21-day delay before warrant violated Fourth Amendment. | Delay reasonable under totality of circumstances given parole status and need to verify evidence. | Not an unreasonable seizure; waiver and parole status supported reasonableness; Dass/Mitchell distinctions noted. |
| Prior state convictions and mandatory minimum enhancements | State offenses do not categorically map to federal sexual-abuse definitions for enhancements. | State offenses relate to the federal generic offenses and qualify under the 'relating to' clause. | State offenses relate to sexual abuse under §2251(e) and §2252(b)(2); enhancements apply. |
| Obstruction of justice enhancement (Section 3C1.1) in guidelines | District court properly denied the enhancement based on credibility findings. | Enhancement should apply for providing false testimony; court must apply correctly. | District court erred; remand for resentencing to recalculate with proper obstruction enhancement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (venue for continuing offenses; location of conduct relevant to §3237)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (Taylor framework for categorical approach; deference to statutory definitions)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach for divisible state statutes)
- Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (2008) (definition of sexual abuse of a minor for enhancement purposes)
- Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (2009) (state offenses relating to sexual abuse may qualify for enhancements)
- United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196 (2011) (broader interpretation of 'relating to' in generic-offense context)
- United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (perjury and testimony-related sentencing implications)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (parolee privacy expectations and search/consent considerations)
- United States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (parole and possessory interests in seized property context)
- United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750 (2008) (relating-to doctrine for enhancements; broad interpretation)
- United States v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076 (2009) (relating to sexual abuse under §2252(b)(2))
- United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (2009) (unreasonable-delay analysis in suppression; Dass contrast)
- United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (1988) (unreasonable seizure doctrine for delays before warrant)