Appellant Geoffrey David McCalla (McCalla) was charged in a two-count in- *752 dietment with producing and possessing child pornography in violation of federal statutes. McCalla filed two motions to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction and the district court denied both. McCalla pled guilty to Count One charging prоduction of child pornography, conditioned only upon his ability to appeal the denial by the district court of his motion to dismiss under the Commerce Clause. On appeal, McCalla argues lack of federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and lack of federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s rulings on both motions to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
In December, 2005, John B. Kuzma (Kuzma), Special Agent with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), began investigating McCalla’s possible use of a child pornography website. In the course of his investigation, Kuzma learned that McCalla had been arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) after a witness reported discovering images in McCalla’s house depicting child pornography.
The images showed the witness’s stepdaughter (Child Victim 1), who appeared to be approximately five years old, аs well as other children, engaging in sexually explicit conduct. In addition to these images, numerous other images depicting child pornography were retrieved from materials seized during a search of McCal-la’s residence and place of employment. Approximately 4,235 suspected child pornography images were recovered from standard file directories in McCalla’s work computer’s hard drive. Approximately 50 suspected child pornography movie files were also recovered.
Following his arrest and the discovery of these images, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against McCalla. Count One charged McCalla with the production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). Count Two charged McCalla with possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Id. at 13. Both counts included the jurisdictional requirement that the child pornography produced оr possessed by McCalla was “produced using materials that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate and foreign commerce by any means, including by computer ...”
McCalla filed two motions to dismiss the indictment. In the first motion, McCalla argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction, specifically contending that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress authority to regulate local production of child pornography. The district court rejected this argument, noting that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gonzales v. Raich,
McCalla filed a subsequent motion to dismiss, arguing the absence of federal territorial jurisdiction because the events did not occur within the exclusive territory of the United States. The district court also denied this second motion.
Thereafter, McCalla entered into a conditional plea agreement with the governmеnt whereby he pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment (production of child pornography). The plea agreement was conditioned upon McCalla’s reservation of the right to seek appellate review of the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss *753 “filed on or about August 11, 2006[the Commerce Clause аrgument].”
In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to several facts, including:
• Beginning in or around January, 2003, and continuing to in or about September, 2004, MeCalla took approximately 45 sexually explicit photographs of Child Victim 1.
• MeCalla produced the pornographic images of this child using materials that had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. In particular, MeCalla used a Sony digital camera that had been manufactured in Japan and transported in interstate and foreign commerce to California.
• Two compact discs cоntaining child pornography that MeCalla kept and used at home contained child pornographic images of Child Victim 1.
• Three compact discs containing child pornography that MeCalla kept and used at work contained child pornographic images of Child Victim 1.
The district court accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced MeCalla to 210 months’ imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. MeCalla timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on constitutional grounds
de novo.” United States v. Latu,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Commerce Clause Challenge
MeCalla argues that Congress lacks authority under the Cоmmerce Clause to regulate the noncommercial and wholly intrastate production of child pornography, and therefore, as applied to him, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) is unconstitutional.
MeCalla makes two main arguments in support of his claim. First, MeCalla argues that the Supreme Court’s most recent decision disсussing the Commerce Clause,
Gonzales v. Raich,
To the extent MeCalla premises his argument on an invitation to set aside or disregard United Stаtes Supreme Court precedent, we simply cannot accommodate him. As the Supreme Court has expressly stated, “it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.”
State Oil Co. v. Khan,
Raich
addressed the question of whether the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was unconstitutional as applied to purely intrastate producers of marijuana for medical purposes under California’s Compassionatе Use Act.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that thе application of CSA provisions criminalizing the intrastate manufacture, distribution or possession of marijuana did not violate the Commerce Clause.
Id.
at 9,
Second, in Raich, the Court reasoned that “[g]iven the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere ..., and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.” Id. (citation and footnote reference omitted).
Third, the Court emphasized, “[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.” Id.
In reaching its holding that application of the CSA to purely intrastate production of marijuana was within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court distinguished the CSA from those statutes that it struck as unconstitutional in
Lopez
(holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an invalid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority) and
Morrison
(striking the Viоlence Against Women Act). The Court distinguished
Raich
from
Lopez
and
Morrison
in part based on the fact that in those cases, the statutes in question had no connection to commerce or economic enterprise.
Raich,
The Supreme Court emphasized that “[u]nlike those at issue in
Lopez
and
Morrison,
the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’ ”
Id.
at 25,
Fourth and finally, the
Raich
Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the cultivation of homegrown medical marijuana represented a “ ‘separate and distinct’ class of activities ... beyond the reach of federal power.”
Id.
The Court determined that not only was this purported class not exemрt from inclusion in the CSA, but it was “an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”
Id.
at 26-27,
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Raich
supports a conclusion that the challenged statute in this case is not unconstitutional because it criminalizes the production of “homegrown” child pornography. Here, as in
Raich,
the statute is comprehensive in that it seeks to regulate (more accurately, exterminate) the entire child pornography market (similar to at least one category of the CSA — marijuana).
See United States v. Maxwell,
Following the reasoning in
Raich,
the task before us then is to determine “whether Congress could rationally conclude that the cumulative effect of the conduct by[MeCalla] and his ilk would substantially affect interstate commerce — specifically the interstate commerce Congress is seеking to eliminate.”
Maxwell,
Other circuits considering this issue
post-Raich
have agreed. The Fourth Circuit noted that “[j]ust as Congress rationally concluded that demand might draw homegrown marijuana into interstate mаrkets, thereby ‘frustrating the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety,’ so too might Congress rationally fear that homemade child pornography would find its way into interstate commerce.”
United States v. Forrest,
Given Congress’s broad interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children, it is eminently rational that Congress would seek to regulate intrastate production of pornography even where there is no evidence that it was created for commerciаl purposes.
See United States v. Ortiz-Graulau,
Because it is rational to conclude that homegrown child pornography affects interstate commerce, we “need not inquirе into the specifics of [McCalla’s] possession: when a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the
de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.”
United States v. Stewart,
McCalla’s reliance on our decision in
United States v. McCoy,
Because McCalla’s Commerce Clause arguments are unavailing, we affirm the district court’s denial of McCalla’s motion to dismiss on this basis.
B. Territorial Jurisdiction
Citing 18 U.S.C. § 7, McCalla raises the argument that federal courts are without jurisdiction over matters that do not occur exclusively in federal territory. This argument is wholly without merit. The federal court’s jurisdiction is not limited to federal crimes committed on federal lands. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “[t]he district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of
all
offеnses against the laws of the United States.” (Emphasis added).
See also United States v. Begay,
TV. CONCLUSION
Regulation of intrastate production of child pornography within the context of eliminating the nationаl child pornography industry is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Application of this statute to McCalla was not unconstitutional. Jurisdiction to enforce § 2251(a) is not limited to federal enclaves as argued by McCalla. Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s denials of both motions to dismiss the indictment.
AFFIRMED.