United States v. E.T.H., JUV, 833 F.3d 931

In 2013, then-16-year-old E.T.H. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for assaulting a federal officer and originally placed on probation until his 19th birthday.
After program placements and subsequent misconduct, the district court revoked probation in Sept. 2014 and ordered detention until age 18 followed by two years' juvenile delinquent supervision.
While serving supervision, E.T.H. violated conditions in Jan. 2015; a revocation proceeding resulted in the court ordering "time served" plus up to 30 days for placement in a residential program and an additional two years of juvenile delinquent supervision.
Defense objected, arguing the combined term of detention and supervision exceeded the statutory maximum under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), specifically 18 U.S.C. § 5037.
The district court declined to treat the government's request for an upward departure as granted and imposed the two-year supervision term; E.T.H. appealed claiming the total exceeded the statutory cap.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 5037(d)(6) permits a post-revocation supervision term that, combined with detention, exceeds the maximum set by § 5037(d)(2) for juveniles under 21	E.T.H.: § 5037(d)(6) is silent for under-21 revocations, so § 5037(d)(2) supplies the cap; maximum combined term = 18 months (Guidelines top) minus prior detention, yielding 13 months 19 days	Government: § 5037(d)(6) controls revocation supervision alone; its text (esp. the "except" clause) limits some revocation-supervision to the juvenile's 24th birthday and Congress intentionally did not incorporate § 5037(d)(2) limits	Court: § 5037(d)(6) must be read with § 5037(d)(2); for under-21 juveniles use age at revocation hearing; cap is the lesser of listed options in § 5037(c)(2)(B) (here 18 months) and subtract the detention ordered at the revocation hearing (not prior detention); remand for entry of sentence not exceeding statutory maximum (17 months here)

United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.) (juvenile sentencing under FJDA reviewed for law violations and plain unreasonableness)
United States v. K.R.A., 337 F.3d 970 (8th Cir.) (discusses district court discretion and upward departures in juvenile revocations)
United States v. A.J., 190 F.3d 873 (8th Cir.) (upward departure authority in juvenile revocation context)
Wilson v. United States, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) (statutory verb tense significant in interpretation)
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (definition of statutory ambiguity)
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (application of last antecedent rule in statutory construction)
Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797 (8th Cir.) (avoid literal readings that lead to absurd results)
Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir.) (rejecting literal interpretations that produce absurd consequences)
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.) (literal statutory interpretation avoided where it leads to unintended results)