Background - In 1994 three brothers — Brian Gill, David Gill, and Samuel McIntosh — were involved in drug sales around 160 Park Hill, Staten Island; a confrontation on June 22, 1994, resulted in the shooting death of Michael Dawson. - Brian and Samuel had earlier (early 1990s) participated with Norbert Grigger in a Maryland crack-distribution operation involving weapons and plans for retaliatory violence. - Defendants were indicted on counts charging (1) drug-related murder and conspiracy to commit drug-related murder (1994) under 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(e)(1)(A) and 846, and (2) a separate 2011–2013 conspiracy to distribute ≥280 grams of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. - At trial the government relied on testimony from cooperating witnesses (Donald Lewis, Norbert Grigger, Paul Ford, among others), 911 recordings, and testimony about both the Maryland activity and the 1994 and 2011–2013 drug conduct. - The superseding indictment did not allege a drug-quantity (≥280 g) in the 1994 murder counts; defendants raised that omission only on appeal. - The jury convicted Brian and David on all counts and Samuel on the 1994 murder and related conspiracy; the district court sentenced Brian to life and David and Samuel to lengthy terms. The Second Circuit affirmed. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Sufficiency of indictment: omission of drug-quantity in Counts 1–2 | Gov: indictment defects do not require reversal because jury was properly instructed and quantity was proven at trial | Defs: omission of 280‑gram allegation in Counts 1–2 deprived them of Fifth Amendment indictment protection | Court: indictment was defective but error not plain — jury instructions and clarifications made quantity an element; no reversible plain error | | Admission of Maryland prior acts (Rule 404(b) / 403) | Gov: prior Maryland conduct admissible to show development of conspiratorial relationships, knowledge, intent, and background | Brian & Samuel: prior acts were propensity evidence and unduly prejudicial | Court: admissible under inclusionary 404(b) approach for proper purposes; limiting instruction and probative value outweighed prejudice; no abuse of discretion under Rule 403 | | Sufficiency of evidence for Counts 1–3 | Gov: testimony (Lewis, Grigger, Ford) and corroborating facts support that defendants participated in conspiracies and that murder was drug-related; quantity proven | Defs: evidence showed only isolated sales or lacked proof of ≥280 g conspiracy and drug‑motive for murder | Court: viewing evidence favorably to gov’t, a rational juror could find defendants knowingly joined conspiracies involving ≥280 g and acted (and conspired) to kill in furtherance of those conspiracies; convictions affirmed | | Admission of statements against penal interest & perjury claim | Gov: Dawson’s and Brian’s statements were self‑inculpatory and corroborated; admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) | David & Samuel: statements not sufficiently trustworthy; David also argues witness Ford perjured himself about seeing him sell drugs | Court: admission proper — statements were against penal interest and corroborated; perjury claim unsupported by rap sheet record; no abuse of discretion | ### Key Cases Cited United States v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2016) (standard for viewing evidence on appeal) United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (crediting inferences for government on appeal) United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (indictment must allege essential elements; quantity requirement for § 841(b)(1)(A)) United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985) (grand jury indictment rights) United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) (plain‑language indictments often sufficient) United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975) (indictment practice) United States v. Santos, 541 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2008) (§ 848(e)(1)(A) requires underlying § 841(b)(1)(A) predicate) Cotton v. United States, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (plain‑error review for indictment defects raised on appeal) Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (plain‑error framework) United States v. Esso, 684 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2012) (presumption that jurors follow instructions) United States v. Rosario, 111 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1997) (jury instruction deference) United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)) United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (404(b) principles) United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) (prior‑act evidence to explain conspiracy background) United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (similarity requirement for 404(b) relevance) United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2000) (Rule 403 balancing and limiting instructions) United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (Rule 403 requires conscientious assessment) United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1992) (Rule 403 analysis guidance) United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (Rule 403 precedent) United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2002) (circumstantial evidence of association can support conspiracy) United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (drug‑related motive for killing need only be one motive) United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015) (elements for drug conspiracy and quantity knowledge) United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2010) (defendant need not know all conspiracy details) United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (conspiracy knowledge standard) United States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2016) (sufficiency standard) United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012) (defer to jury credibility findings) United States v. Brock, 789 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2015) (high burden for sufficiency challenges) United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014) (804(b)(3) statement‑against‑interest requirements) United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (trustworthiness factors for out‑of‑court statements) Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (statement‑against‑interest analysis) United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) (statement need not alone convict but must be probative) United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (corroboration for trustworthiness) United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1987) (strong inference of trustworthiness required) United States v. Cacace, 796 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2015) (credibility and cross‑examination issues) * United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1991) (defendant unavailable declarant doctrine)