United States v. Douglas Jackson, 932 F.3d 556

Defendants Jenkins and Jackson were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for using or carrying a firearm in connection with a federal "crime of violence."
In United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016), this court held § 924(c)(3)(B) (the residual clause defining "crime of violence") unconstitutionally vague.
On February 24, 2017, the court vacated Jenkins’s § 924(c) conviction; on August 4, 2017, it vacated Jackson’s conviction and also addressed a sentencing-role (organizer/supervisor) enhancement issue.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), changed the landscape by finding a similar residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 unconstitutionally vague, but left open doctrinal questions and produced fractured opinions.
Circuits split post-Dimaya over whether § 924(c)(3)(B) could be saved by abandoning the categorical approach; some circuits upheld the clause by rejecting the categorical approach while others continued to find it void for vagueness.
The Supreme Court resolved the issue in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), holding § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague because it required the categorical approach and thus could not sustain enforcement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) is unconstitutionally vague	§924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness (relies on Johnson and Cardena)	Statute can be interpreted to avoid vagueness (reject categorical approach)	Clause is unconstitutionally vague; Davis forecloses saving construction
Whether Dimaya requires reconsideration of prior Seventh Circuit vacaturs	Dimaya supports vagueness holdings and vacatur remains correct	Some argued Dimaya created uncertainty and counsel of caution	Court awaited Davis; after Davis, prior vacaturs stand and are affirmed
Remedy for convictions based on § 924(c)(3)(B)	Vacatur of §924(c) convictions and remand for resentencing	Defendants sought full resentencing; government might limit relief	Vacate §924(c) convictions and remand for full resentencing (holistic)
Applicability of sentencing adjustments (organizer/supervisor) following vacatur	Challenge to §3B1.1 adjustment where tied to vacated count	Government defended enhancement	Court vacated and remanded resentencing without organizer/supervisor adjustment for Jackson (as explained in prior opinion)

United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (Seventh Circuit held §924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Jenkins, 849 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2017) (vacated Jenkins’s §924(c) conviction based on Cardena)
United States v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2017) (vacated Jackson’s §924(c) conviction and addressed sentencing-role enhancement)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (Supreme Court found similar residual clause in §16 unconstitutionally vague; fractured opinions on doctrinal approach)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause; foundational vagueness precedent)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Supreme Court held §924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague because it required the categorical approach)
United States v. Cureton, 739 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2014) (explains that sentencing is holistic and partial vacatur warrants full resentencing)