United States v. Donnie Walton
881 F.3d 768
9th Cir.2018Background
- Walton pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which requires three prior violent felonies for a 15-year mandatory minimum.
- At sentencing the court counted four prior convictions as violent felonies: (1) California assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Pen. Code § 245(a)(1)); (2) California second-degree robbery (Cal. Pen. Code § 211); (3) Alabama first-degree robbery (Ala. Code § 13A-8-41); and (4) Alabama attempted murder (Ala. Code §§ 13A-4-2, 13A-6-2).
- Only ACCA’s force clause was at issue because the Government did not rely on the enumerated clause and the residual clause is void for vagueness (Johnson II).
- The court applied the categorical approach (and the modified categorical approach only where a statute is divisible) to ask whether the statutes’ least culpable conduct necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.
- The Ninth Circuit held Alabama first-degree robbery (which depends on third-degree robbery’s force or an aggravator such as being armed) and California second-degree robbery do not qualify as ACCA violent felonies because each can be satisfied by only minimal or negligent force.
- Because at least two of Walton’s four predicates fail to qualify as violent felonies, ACCA’s three-predicate requirement is not met; the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alabama first-degree robbery (Ala. Code § 13A-8-41) is an ACCA "violent felony" under the force clause | It is a violent felony because it includes being armed or causing serious injury and is based on robbery (use/threat of force) | Walton: statute can be violated by minimal non-violent force or mere possession of a weapon; thus it does not necessarily involve "violent force" | Not a violent felony: third-degree robbery can be based on minimal force; being armed (first-degree aggravator) can exist without use/threat of force, and Govt waived divisibility argument |
| Whether California second-degree robbery (Cal. Pen. Code § 211) is an ACCA "violent felony" under the force clause | It counts because robbery involves force or fear | Walton: California robbery can be committed negligently (e.g., accidental injury) and the statute is indivisible, so least culpable conduct does not require violent force | Not a violent felony: Ninth Circuit’s Dixon controls — force can be only negligent and statute is indivisible |
| Appropriate standard of review for predicate-categorization issues raised on appeal | Govt: plain-error because Walton did not raise the precise arguments below | Walton: preserved challenge to number of violent felonies; purely legal question suitable for de novo review | Court reviews de novo because issue is purely legal and Govt suffered no prejudice |
| Whether vacatur is required if at least two predicates are non-qualifying | Govt: counts all four predicates so ACCA applies | Walton: with two predicates invalid, ACCA’s three-predicate threshold is unmet | Vacatur and remand for resentencing because ACCA enhancement not supported |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach governs whether prior convictions qualify as ACCA predicates)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (courts look to statutory elements, not underlying facts)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Johnson I) (ACCA requires "violent force" — substantial physical force)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Johnson II) (residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (distinguishes minor force from the substantial force required under ACCA)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (modified categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes)
- United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.) (California robbery not a violent felony under ACCA’s force clause)
- United States v. Molinar, 876 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (robbery statutes susceptible to minimal force violations are not crimes of violence under force-clause analogues)