United States v. Donnie Sumner, 816 F.3d 1040

In 1989 Sumner entered an Alford plea to first-degree deviate sexual assault under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.070 (victim alleged to be 14 or 15); he received a suspended sentence and probation.
In 2013 investigators found child pornography files on computers traced to Sumner; he was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) for receipt and distribution and pleaded guilty.
A PSR concluded Sumner’s 1989 Missouri conviction qualified as a predicate under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), triggering the 15-year mandatory minimum; Sumner objected.
Sumner argued the district court should examine the underlying facts (to show consensual, non‑abusive conduct) and that his suspended sentence did not constitute a qualifying conviction; the district court rejected his objections.
On appeal Sumner conceded the suspended sentence issue; the central dispute was whether the prior conviction qualified as a predicate offense and whether the court could consider underlying facts beyond the charging documents.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: the charging document showed the victim was 14–15, the categorical/Shepard-limited inquiry was appropriate, and the prior conviction qualified as "abusive sexual conduct involving a minor."

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sumner’s 1989 Missouri conviction qualifies as a § 2252(b)(1) predicate	Sumner: underlying facts show a consensual act without force or threats, so it is not "abusive sexual conduct" and should not trigger enhancement	Government: statute and charging document (victim 14–15) show the conviction relates to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor and qualifies under § 2252(b)(1)	The court held the conviction qualifies; charging document sufficed under the Shepard-limited categorical approach and no force/threats element is required
Whether the district court may consider underlying factual proffers beyond the limited Shepard items	Sumner: court should examine underlying facts to determine abuse	Government: inquiry is limited to the statute and Shepard-approved documents (charging instrument, plea colloquy, etc.)	The court held the Shepard-limited inquiry was proper and did not err by declining to consider broader underlying facts

United States v. Hagen, 641 F.3d 268 (8th Cir.) (standard for reviewing alleged procedural sentencing errors)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (sentencing review framework)
United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 324 (8th Cir.) (standards for reviewing factual findings and statutory interpretation at sentencing)
United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148 (8th Cir.) (prior conviction involving touching a minor satisfies § 2252(b)(1))
United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667 (8th Cir.) (approving categorical approach and Shepard-limited documents for predicate-offense inquiry)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limiting what court may consult to determine the factual basis of a plea for sentence-enhancement purposes)
Linngren v. United States, 652 F.3d 864 (8th Cir.) (conviction for sexual contact with a minor satisfied § 2252(b)(1))
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (use of ordinary, contemporary, common meaning for undefined statutory terms)
United States v. Storer, 413 F.3d 918 (8th Cir.) (treatment of suspended sentences as convictions for certain federal sentencing purposes)