919 F.3d 1123
9th Cir.2019Background
- FBI Special Agent Stonie Carlson, part of a federal-state fugitive task force, sought to locate and investigate Donnell Artis and Chanta Hopkins, both fugitives with outstanding California arrest warrants.
- Carlson obtained two Alameda County Superior Court warrants: one to search Artis’ cell phone for evidence of state-law credit-card fraud (warrant directed to “any peace officer”), and a second authorizing 30 days’ use of a cell-site simulator to locate a phone tied to Hopkins. Both warrants were obtained from state judges rather than a federal magistrate.
- Federal agents executed both warrants (an FBI agent extracted data from Artis’ phone; a federal agent deployed the cell-site simulator to locate Hopkins). The Hopkins warrant expressly authorized U.S. Marshals to assist.
- The district court suppressed evidence from both warrants, concluding federal agents lacked authority under California law to execute state warrants and that neither warrant was supported by probable cause; it rejected the good-faith exception. The government appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit held that a state-law prohibition on federal officers executing state warrants does not invalidate a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, but found the Artis warrant lacked probable cause (after excising evidence obtained in an unlawful apartment safety sweep) and affirmed suppression for Artis; it reversed suppression as to Hopkins.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of state warrants when executed by federal agents | Artis & Hopkins: warrants invalid because California law limits execution to "peace officers" and excludes federal officers | Government: Fourth Amendment validity does not depend on state authorization to execute; warrants were issued by neutral state judges | Warrants valid under Fourth Amendment despite potential state-law violation; execution by federal agents alone does not invalidate warrant |
| Whether Artis warrant had probable cause to search phone for credit-card fraud | Artis: affidavit relied on evidence from an unlawful apartment safety sweep; remaining affidavit lacks probable cause | Government: affidavit also referenced informant and Artis’ prior identity-theft warrant; argues probable cause existed | After striking evidence from the unlawful search, remaining affidavit did not establish probable cause for credit-card fraud; warrant invalid |
| Applicability of good-faith exception to fruits of Artis warrant | Artis: suppression warranted because magistrate relied on evidence from prior illegal search; police misconduct not protected by good-faith | Government: invokes Leon good-faith exception (and more recent precedent like Herring) | Good-faith exception does not save the evidence because the crucial evidence was obtained via deliberate/unexplained unconstitutional conduct and government did not defend the prior search |
| Whether Hopkins warrant (cell-site simulator) had probable cause linking target phone to Hopkins | Hopkins: affidavit failed to sufficiently corroborate informant’s claim that the targeted number was his | Government: corroboration existed — notifications from that number on Artis’ phone plus cooperating witness’ tip | Probable cause established (informant corroborated by missed/incoming calls to Artis from the targeted number); suppression reversed for Hopkins |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (cell-phone searches generally require a warrant)
- Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate; three warrant requirements)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (informant reliability and totality-of-the-circumstances standard for probable cause)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (limits on exclusion when police errors are isolated negligence)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruits doctrine)
- United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1989) (good-faith exception inapplicable where officers’ misconduct produced the evidence)