United States v. Donatus Iriele
977 F.3d 1155
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- AMARC was a low‑quality Atlanta clinic functioning as a "pill mill" that regularly issued large quantities of opioids, alprazolam, and carisoprodol; many other pharmacies began refusing its prescriptions.
- MCP, a nearby cash‑only pharmacy run by Donatus Iriele and Rosemary Ofume, filled the vast majority of AMARC prescriptions and purchased unusually large volumes of opioids.
- MCP derived the overwhelming share of its revenue from AMARC prescriptions; AMARC staff regularly referred patients to MCP and the two businesses had frequent communications and favors.
- Undercover DEA visits showed AMARC doctors prescribing controlled substances and MCP filling those prescriptions; law enforcement later seized a handwritten ledger and other records from Iriele’s home and MCP.
- A jury convicted Iriele of drug conspiracy and distribution/dispensing offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841/§ 846 and of money‑laundering offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957; he appealed multiple issues, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of handwriting opinion (Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2)) | Gov: an investigator who became familiar with handwriting during the investigation may testify as a lay witness under Rule 901(b)(2). | Iriele: agent’s familiarity was acquired for the litigation and thus lay‑opinion identification was barred. | Court: allowed testimony; investigator’s familiarity gained while investigating a crime is not categorically barred by Rule 901(b)(2). |
| Sufficiency of evidence for drug conspiracy and distribution (§§ 846, 841) | Gov: circumstantial proof (volume of pills, drug combos, patient indicia, referral relationship, MCP’s financial dependence on AMARC) shows knowledge and voluntary participation. | Iriele: no direct evidence he knew of AMARC’s unlawful agreement or that he joined it; he did not personally work at AMARC. | Court: evidence sufficient — red flags and MCP’s role supported findings of knowledge and participation; convictions on Counts 1–4 sustained. |
| Jury instruction on pharmacist standard under § 841(a)(1) | Gov: (on appeal) error was not prejudicial given overwhelming evidence of knowledge; also argued license revocation issue not outcome‑dispositive. | Iriele: district court misinstructed by applying physician standard to a pharmacist (should require knowing that physician’s prescription lacked legitimate medical purpose). | Court: instruction was legally incorrect but not reversible plain error — overwhelming evidence negated prejudice; conviction affirmed. |
| Jury instructions on money‑laundering counts (§§ 1956(h), 1957) | Gov: overall charge, pattern language elsewhere, expert testimony, and trial presentation supplied the missing elements; any omission was harmless. | Iriele: court failed to give separate element instructions on conspiracy to launder and on §1957 financial‑transaction elements, depriving jury guidance. | Court: some element language was omitted but other instructions and evidence cured error; no reversible plain error as substantial rights not affected; money‑laundering convictions affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013) (defines standards for convicting physicians vs. pharmacists under § 841(a)(1))
- United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015) (circumstantial evidence and red flags can establish conspiracy knowledge and participation)
- United States v. Hammond, 781 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (pharmacist conviction upheld where extraordinary prescription volume and role supported culpability)
- United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Feldman, 936 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (elements and proof for money‑laundering conspiracy convictions)
- United States v. Samet, 466 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (investigator familiarity during investigation may permit lay handwriting opinion)
- United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1978) (distinguishes one‑shot trial preparation comparisons from routine familiarity for lay handwriting opinions)