United States v. Donald Howard Conkright, 20-12104

Conkright and co‑conspirators induced a Texas school district to wire nearly $2 million meant for construction work into a bank account in Conkright’s name; he spent, withdrew, and transferred the funds.
Indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. §1956(h)), one count of money laundering by concealment (18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i)), and two counts under 18 U.S.C. §1957; he pled not guilty and went to trial.
Defense theory: Conkright believed he was managing funds for a purported heiress and lacked the requisite mens rea; he sought to introduce an expert on his mental condition and voicemails between co‑conspirators and third parties for context.
The district court excluded the proffered expert testimony and most voicemails as potentially confusing; Conkright nevertheless testified that he thought the conduct “looked like fraud” and acknowledged he believed he may have been laundering money and made lavish purchases with the proceeds.
Jury convicted on all counts; PSR applied a two‑level sophisticated‑laundering enhancement (U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(3)), yielding a 70–87 month range; district court sentenced Conkright to 71 months and stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if the enhancement did not apply.
Conkright appealed, raising (for the first time) constitutional challenges to the evidentiary exclusions and arguing the sophisticated‑laundering enhancement was erroneous.

Issue	Conkright’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Exclusion of expert testimony and voicemails (claimed Fifth and Sixth Amendment violation)	Expert would show lack of mens rea; voicemails give context negating criminal intent	Testimony was justification/mitigation, not true lack of mens rea; voicemails irrelevant or confusing	Reviewed for plain error; even if exclusion were error, Conkright’s own testimony admitted belief he may have been laundering, so jury could infer mens rea; no reversible error; convictions affirmed
Sentencing: application of sophisticated‑laundering enhancement (U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(3))	Enhancement improper because Conkright merely opened accounts and acted at others’ direction, not sophisticated laundering	Enhancement supported; but government recommended 71 months (same as if enhancement did not apply) and court said it would impose same sentence regardless	Even assuming the enhancement was erroneous, the district court’s 71‑month sentence was reasonable under §3553(a) and the error was harmless because the court stated it would impose the same term; sentence affirmed

United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (plain‑error review applies to constitutional claims raised first on appeal)
United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2019) (jury may infer mens rea from defendant’s testimony)
United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2004) (defendant’s right to present evidence is implicit in Sixth Amendment and due process)
United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (sentencing‑guidelines calculation error can be harmless if court states it would impose same sentence absent the error)
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review)
United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009) (reasonableness reviewed under the totality of the circumstances)
United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of Sentencing Guidelines application)
United States v. Scott, 441 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (guidelines‑calculation errors are reversible absent harmlessness)