United States v. Donald, 84 F.4th 59

Background:

Donald was arrested Nov. 30, 2017 during federal searches of two apartments; agents read Miranda warnings and gave a waiver form he signed but did not check the box waiving rights.
After being taken to speak privately and then transported to Worcester Police Department, Donald reiterated he wanted to talk and was Mirandized again; the interview was audio/video recorded.
During the recorded interview Donald asked, “None of this can be used against me, can it?” and the recording, the parties dispute, contains Task Force Officer Morris saying “No.”
Shortly after the exchange Donald was encouraged to cooperate and then gave a detailed confession about his drug trafficking and supplier; he was later federally charged and convicted on several counts.
The district court denied suppression, finding either Morris did not say “No” or the response was unintelligible and that, under the totality of the circumstances, Donald knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda. The First Circuit reversed: it concluded Morris did say “No,” that the government failed to prove a knowing waiver, and vacated the convictions and remanded.

Issues:

Issue	Donald's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Officer Morris replied “No” to Donald’s question about whether statements could be used against him	Morris audibly said “No,” and Donald reasonably relied on that as an assurance	The recording is ambiguous; if a response occurred it was unintelligible and did not mislead Donald about Miranda protections	First Circuit: clear error to find no intelligible “No”; the court concluded Morris did say “No.”
Whether any Miranda waiver after the alleged “No” was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary	The “No” could reasonably be read as promising statements would not be used, so any subsequent waiver was not knowing	Even if Morris said “No,” the totality of circumstances (Donald’s familiarity with rights, his initiation, later hypotheticals) show no confusion and a valid waiver	First Circuit: de novo review — government failed to meet its burden; the “No” could have confused Donald about Miranda, so waiver invalid.
Whether Donald had impliedly waived Miranda earlier by reinitiating contact at the scene	Reinitiation did not amount to a waiver after an earlier invocation of rights	Donald initiated the interview and participated, so he impliedly waived	First Circuit: follows precedent — mere initiation of communication after invoking rights does not by itself effect a waiver; government’s late argument unpersuasive.
Whether any error was harmless	N/A	Even if an error occurred, it was harmless because other evidence supported convictions	First Circuit: error not harmless; vacated convictions and remanded.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (establishes Miranda warnings and standards for waiver)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1986) (two-part test: voluntariness and knowing, intelligent waiver)
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (U.S. 1979) (totality-of-circumstances test for waiver)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975) (limits on reinitiation of interrogation after invocation)
Hart v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 323 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 2003) (post-waiver assurances can invalidate Miranda waiver)
United States v. Carpentino, 948 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020) (initiating further communication after invocation does not alone effect a waiver)
United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (assesses implied waiver in context of post-invocation dialogue)
United States v. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006) (standard of review: legal questions de novo; factual findings for clear error)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S. 2007) (video evidence can conclusively resolve factual disputes)