United States v. Doe
145 F. Supp. 3d 167
E.D.N.Y2015Background
- A sealed Juvenile Information charged Defendant (John Doe), a U.S. citizen who was 17 at the time, with conspiracy to provide material support to ISIL (18 U.S.C. § 2339B); the Attorney General sought transfer to adult prosecution under the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA).
- FBI/JTTF surveillance and evidence (texts, internet searches, bank withdrawals) showed Defendant’s communications with co-actor Munther Omar Saleh, interest in ISIL, viewing of bomb-related materials, and alleged financial assistance to acquire bomb components.
- On June 13–19, 2015, law enforcement observed suspicious travel, vehicle cleaning, anti-surveillance maneuvers, and a physical approach to a law-enforcement vehicle by Defendant and Saleh; both were arrested.
- Defendant conceded age and AG certification but challenged transfer, arguing the JDA’s reference to “crime of violence” (§ 16(b)) is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson and that the six Nelson factors weigh against transfer.
- The district court (Brodie, J.) held an evidentiary hearing, found § 16(b) constitutional as-applied to a § 2339B conspiracy, weighed the six statutory factors, and granted transfer to adult prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juvenile meets statutory prerequisites for transfer (age & AG certification) | Government: Defendant was 17 at offense, AG certified transfer | Doe: conceded age and AG certification | Met; prerequisites satisfied (agreed/undisputed) |
| Whether the JDA’s term “crime of violence” (via 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)) is unconstitutionally vague | Gov: §16(b) valid as-applied; material-support conspiracy falls within §16(b) | Doe: §16(b) vague post-Johnson; categorical risk-estimation invalid | Court: as-applied review; §16(b) not vague as-applied to §2339B conspiracy; Johnson distinguished |
| Whether conspiracy to provide material support (§2339B) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under §16(b) | Gov: §2339B contemplates/produces substantial risk of use of physical force (enhanced penalties, definitions) | Doe: categorical approach requires speculative risk-estimation akin to Johnson | Held: qualifies under §16(b); material-support conspiracies inherently pose substantial risk of force |
| Whether transfer is in the interest of justice under the six Nelson factors | Gov: factors (age proximity to 18, nature of crime, maturity) favor transfer; limited juvenile programs for terrorism offenders | Doe: factors favor juvenile adjudication; vagueness and rehabilitative potential | Court: balancing favors transfer — age, offense nature, maturity weigh heavily for transfer; prior record and program availability weigh against but less heavily |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir.) (procedural standard for JDA transfer)
- United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir.) (discussion of Nelson factors and weighting)
- United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859 (2d Cir.) (use of §16 definition of crime of violence under JDA)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (ACCA residual-clause vagueness decision; framework discussed and distinguished)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2010) (Congressional findings on material support; relevance to violent risk)
- Farhane v. United States, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.) (as-applied preference in vagueness review)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2004) (distinction between risk of use of force and risk of injury; interpretive guidance for §16)
- United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va.) (holding material support can be a crime of violence under analogous definitions)