United States v. Dobbins
3:12-cr-00100
E.D. Tenn.Dec 21, 2016Background
- Petitioner Farris J. Dobbins committed two armed carjackings on July 25, 2012 and pleaded guilty to two counts of armed carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and one count of using/brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); one § 924(c) count was dismissed in plea agreement.
- On February 27, 2013 the court sentenced Dobbins to an aggregate 240 months: concurrent 156-month terms for the § 2119 convictions and a consecutive 84 months for the § 924(c) conviction.
- Dobbins did not appeal his conviction or sentence directly. On June 20, 2016 he filed a pro se § 2255 motion invoking Johnson v. United States.
- Dobbins argued Johnson, which invalidated the ACCA residual clause, also invalidates the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B), thereby undermining his § 924(c) conviction.
- The Government opposed. The Court considered Sixth Circuit precedent distinguishing the ACCA residual clause from § 924(c)(3)(B) and also evaluated whether federal carjacking categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The Court denied and dismissed Dobbins’s § 2255 motion with prejudice, concluding Johnson did not afford relief and certifying that an appeal would be frivolous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson invalidates the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) so as to vacate Dobbins’s § 924(c) conviction | Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause extends to the similarly worded residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) | Sixth Circuit precedent distinguishes § 924(c)(3)(B) from the ACCA residual clause; Johnson does not control | Denied — Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B) under controlling Sixth Circuit precedent (Pawlak; Taylor) |
| Whether, even if § 924(c)(3)(B) were invalid, Dobbins’s § 924(c) conviction survives because carjacking is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) (use-of-force clause) | Johnson would void the residual clause, but that would still require vacatur unless carjacking qualifies under the force clause | Federal carjacking necessarily involves force or violence and thus categorically qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Denied — § 2119 carjacking is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), so § 924(c) conviction remains valid |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause under Sixth Circuit precedent)
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (identifying significant differences between ACCA residual clause and § 924(c)(3)(B) and rejecting extension of Johnson)
- United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (§ 2255 relief does not encompass all claimed errors)
- Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2006) (standards for § 2255 relief)