United States v. Dixon
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16374
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Dixon conspired to distribute crack cocaine from 2007 to 2008; pleaded guilty March 19, 2010 to conspiracy to distribute 50+ g cocaine base and to firearm possession.
- At offense time, 1986 Act imposed 100:1 crack/powder penalties; 50 g crack yielded a 10-year minimum.
- FSA enacted Aug 3, 2010 reduced crack/powder ratio to ~18:1; new minimums triggered at 28 g (5 years) and 280 g (10 years).
- Guidelines were amended via emergency authority in FSA § 8; new guidelines effective Nov 1, 2010.
- Dixon was sentenced Oct 25, 2010; district court applied the old 1986 Act minimums; Dixon appealed.
- Court analyzes whether FSA applies to sentencing after enactment for pre-enactment conduct, remanding for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FSA applies retroactively to sentencing after enactment. | Dixon: FSA should apply as the act’s intent was to restore fairness. | Government: Saving Statute preserves old penalties; FSA not retroactive. | Yes; FSA applies to Dixon. |
| Role of Saving Statute vs. FSA in retroactivity. | Dixon argues Saving Statute preserves penalties. | Goverment argues Saving Statute controls unless implied conflict. | Saving Statute does not bar FSA retroactivity here. |
| Interpretation of Congress’s intent in §8 emergency directive. | FSA intended immediate alignment of sentencing with new minimums. | Disagreement on immediate applicability to pre-enactment conduct. | Congress intended immediate application of FSA to all sentences as of Aug 3, 2010. |
| Impact on Guidelines vs. statutory minimums during transition. | Guidelines should conform to FSA; minimums should not control. | Guidelines to conform; FSA controls the mandatory minimums. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Vera Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.2011) (retroactivity of FSA to pre-enactment conduct in Dixon context)
- United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.2011) (supports immediate application of FSA to sentencing after enactment)
- United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir.2011) (disagreement with Dixon on retroactivity rationale)
- Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452 (1908) (saving statute cannot override clear congressional intent)
- Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (saving statute interaction with later statutes)
- Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (express statement requirement not literal; look to legislative intent)
- Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2006) (express-statement concept in statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110 (3d Cir.2010) (distinguishes Dixon-type retroactivity question from Reevey)