United States v. Divna Maslenjak
821 F.3d 675
6th Cir.2016Background
- Divna Maslenjak, a Bosnian Serb, obtained refugee status and later U.S. naturalization after immigration interviews in 1998; she denied that her husband served in the Bosnian Serb military.
- Her husband was later convicted of making false statements about his military service; Maslenjak admitted at a 2009 asylum hearing that she had lied in 1998.
- Maslenjak filed an N-400 in 2006 and answered “no” to questions whether she had knowingly given false or misleading information to obtain immigration benefits; she was naturalized in 2007.
- Indicted in 2013, she was convicted by a jury of knowingly procuring naturalization contrary to law (18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)) and knowingly using an unlawfully issued certificate (18 U.S.C. § 1423); the district court revoked her naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).
- On appeal she argued (1) the district court erred by instructing the jury that materiality is not an element of § 1425(a), and (2) it erred/unconstitutionally applied a theory that she lacked good moral character under the INA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Maslenjak) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1425(a) requires proof that false statements were material | Materiality is an implied element; mandatory denaturalization is severe so materiality must be required | Statute’s plain text omits “material”; §1425(a) covers conduct “contrary to law,” including violations that do not require materiality | Materiality is not an implied element of § 1425(a) where the predicate offense (e.g., §1015(a)) does not require materiality; jury instruction was correct |
| Whether the phrase “contrary to law” is limited to INA violations | It should be limited to INA prerequisites (so materiality under civil §1451(a) controls) | Broad reading: “contrary to law” includes all laws applicable to naturalization (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1015(a), §1001) | “Contrary to law” covers all laws applicable to naturalization, not just the INA; the district court properly instructed accordingly |
| Whether convicting for procuring naturalization for lack of "good moral character" is a status-based punishment in violation of the Constitution | Conviction penalizes status (lack of good moral character) rather than conduct; violates Robinson principle | Conviction punishes conduct (knowingly procuring naturalization by false testimony), not mere status | Conviction was for conduct (procuring naturalization contrary to law) and not an unconstitutional status crime |
| Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (false testimony) is unconstitutionally vague or was misinstructed | The statute is vague as-applied and the jury should have been told “testimony” = oral under oath and that intent to obtain benefit must be specific | Kungys limits “testimony” to oral statements under oath and requires proof of intent; district court’s instructions adequately tracked the law | Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied; any deficiency in instructing what counted as “testimony” was harmless because the record contained oral sworn statements and the intent requirement was conveyed |
Key Cases Cited
- Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (Sup. Ct.) (materiality not required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); “testimony” limited to oral statements under oath)
- Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (Sup. Ct.) (strict compliance with naturalization requirements; civil denaturalization principles)
- Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (elements of federal crimes are for Congress to define)
- Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (Sup. Ct.) (courts should not read elements into statutes absent textual support)
- United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.) (read a materiality element into § 1425(a); court disagreed with this approach)
- United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278 (6th Cir.) (statutory-interpretation starting point and review standards referenced)
- United States v. Teh, 535 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.) (construing “contrary to law” broadly in another § 545 context)
Disposition
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and the district court’s revocation of Maslenjak’s naturalization, holding that (1) § 1425(a) does not require proof of materiality when the predicate offense (e.g., §1015(a)) lacks a materiality element, (2) “contrary to law” embraces all laws applicable to naturalization, and (3) the good-moral-character and vagueness challenges fail.