951 F.3d 937
8th Cir.2020Background
- Defendant Dion Clayborn pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and the PSR recommended career‑offender treatment under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior Illinois and Iowa delivery convictions.
- The Illinois conviction was for delivery under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/407(b)(2); the Iowa conviction was under Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) for possession with intent to deliver.
- Clayborn objected that those convictions do not qualify as § 4B1.2(b) “controlled substance offense” predicates because “delivery” need not be commercial and the statutes reach inchoate or non‑transfer conduct.
- The district court overruled the objection, adopted an advisory Guidelines range, but varied downward and sentenced Clayborn to 144 months’ imprisonment; Clayborn appealed only the career‑offender classification.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the Illinois and Iowa statutes qualify categorically as controlled substance offenses, that the Guidelines commentary (Note 1) reasonably includes inchoate offenses, and that Application Note 8 permitted use of the older Illinois conviction based on relevant conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Clayborn's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convictions for "delivery" under Illinois and Iowa law categorically qualify as a § 4B1.2(b) controlled substance offense | Delivery does not require a commercial aspect; § 4B1.2(b) uses "distribute" (implying commercial trafficking), so these statutes are not predicates | "Distribute" includes "deliver"; ordinary meaning of distribute/deliver covers transfers regardless of remuneration | Statutes categorically qualify; delivery (including constructive transfers) falls within § 4B1.2(b) |
| Whether the Guidelines commentary (Application Note 1) may properly include aiding/abetting, attempting, conspiring as predicates | Note 1 is inconsistent or plainly erroneous as written | Note 1 is authoritative commentary and has been previously upheld as reasonable | Note 1 is a permissible, non‑erroneous interpretation and applies |
| Whether the Iowa and Illinois statutes are overbroad because they cover constructive transfers, solicitation, or mere agreement | Iowa’s constructive/actual transfer language and Illinois solicitation/aiding provisions make the statutes broader than § 4B1.2(b) | Constructive transfers are rationally understood as distribution; Clayborn was convicted under delivery statutes, not solicitation statutes | Iowa constructive transfer decisions control; constructive transfers count as distribution; Illinois solicitation statute not implicated because conviction was under the delivery provision |
| Whether the Illinois conviction (sentence imposed in 2000) falls outside the 15‑year lookback for qualifying prior sentences under § 4A1.2(e) | The conviction is too old to count as a career‑offender predicate | Application Note 8 permits considering relevant conduct dating to 2014, bringing the 2000 sentence within the applicable period | Note 8 is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent and the district court permissibly treated the 2000 conviction as a predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for career‑offender classification)
- United States v. Maldonado, 864 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2017) (Iowa possession with intent to deliver is a categorical controlled substance offense)
- United States v. Martinez, 870 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2017) (apply ordinary tools of statutory interpretation to Guidelines)
- United States v. Fulford, 662 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2011) (Guidelines language given its plain and ordinary meaning)
- United States v. Hernandez, 986 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1993) (§ 841 distribution need not prove an actual sale)
- United States v. Mendoza‑Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995) (Guidelines Note 1 reasonably interpreted to include inchoate offenses)
- United States v. Rosenkrans, 236 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2001) (Application Note 8 not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with § 4A1.2)
- United States v. Glass, 904 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2018) (actual or constructive transfer qualifies as distribution)
- United States v. Redden, 875 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2017) (state definitions of "delivery" fall within § 4B1.2(b) because transfer = distribute)