United States v. Diaz-Lugo
963 F.3d 145
| 1st Cir. | 2020Background
- In Nov. 2017 Puerto Rico police stopped a car and found two firearms converted to fire automatically and four high-capacity magazines; appellant Alexis O. Díaz‑Lugo was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms and possession of a machine gun.
- Díaz‑Lugo had a prior federal felony conviction for being a felon in possession, served prison, and was on supervised release (with prior probation violations and an abscondment).
- After initially denying guilt, Díaz‑Lugo pleaded guilty following discussions about potential cooperation and participated in three proffer sessions. The government concluded his proffers were "not actionable."
- The PSI calculated a Guidelines sentencing range (GSR) of 30–37 months (unchallenged). The district court imposed an upwardly variant 60‑month sentence (concurrent on counts, consecutive to any supervised‑release revocation sentence).
- Díaz‑Lugo appealed, arguing procedural error (failure to consider/credit cooperation; improper weight to an unconvicted drug arrest; nullification of acceptance credit; inadequate explanation for and excessive extent of an upward variance) and substantive unreasonableness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Díaz‑Lugo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court failed to consider Díaz‑Lugo's cooperation or was constrained by absence of a §5K1.1 motion | The government told the court the proffers occurred but were "not actionable" and did not contend the court couldn't weigh cooperation | Court refused to recognize its discretion to vary downward for cooperation because gov't did not file a §5K1.1 motion | Court: Sentencing judge had discretion to consider cooperation; record shows cooperation was raised and considered; no abuse of discretion; no downward variance required because cooperation produced no actionable results |
| Whether the court improperly relied on an unconvicted drug arrest or disparaged local courts | Govt did not rely on the arrest as basis for sentence | Mentioning the dismissed drug arrest and comment about local courts improperly influenced sentencing | Court: Passing mention of the arrest was historical and did not affect the sentence; disparaging remark about local courts was inappropriate but harmless |
| Whether the upward variance nullified the USSG §3E1.1 acceptance‑of‑responsibility credit | N/A (court awarded the 3‑level reduction) | Upward variance effectively negated the benefit of acceptance credit | Court: No nullification — acceptance credit and upward variance are distinct determinations; no legal basis to treat one as negating the other |
| Whether the court relied on factors already in the GSR (heartland) and failed to justify/over‑weighed them (extent) | Court emphasized factors unique to this case (two machine guns, four extended magazines, repeated supervised‑release/probation violations) | GSR already accounted for firearm and supervised‑release status; variance extent excessive and insufficiently justified | Court: District court explained why these factors warranted extra weight (possession of multiple machine guns/mags; repeated violations not fully captured by Guidelines); explanation and extent were reasonable and the 60‑month sentence was substantively defensible |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Miranda‑Díaz, 942 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019) (two‑step procedural/substantive sentencing review)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard and deference to sentencing court)
- United States v. Landrón‑Class, 696 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2012) (sentencing courts may consider cooperation even absent a §5K1.1 motion)
- United States v. Fields, 858 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2017) (must explain when relying on a factor already accounted for in the Guidelines)
- United States v. Zapete‑Garcia, 447 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (requirement to identify why a guideline‑accounted factor deserves extra weight)
- United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006) (degree of cooperation may vary in weight; fruitless cooperation need not justify a variance)
- United States v. Díaz‑Rivera, 957 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2020) (a sentencing court may not treat an arrest as equivalent to guilt without reliable indication underlying conduct occurred)
- United States v. Fernández‑Cabrera, 625 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2010) (practical sufficiency of a sentencing explanation)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (substantive‑reasonableness inquiry requires a plausible rationale and defensible result)
- Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020) (standard of review for sentencing challenges)