United States v. DeLEON
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9776
4th Cir.2012Background
- DeLeon lived in Okinawa with his wife Sabrina and her two children, including Jordan, whom DeLeon helped supervise.
- Jordan died after being punished; autopsy showed fatal liver laceration from blunt force and bruising; death occurred six to twelve hours after the fatal blow.
- The prosecution's theory was circumstantial: DeLeon used corporal punishment and caused the fatal injury; witnesses described a pattern of discipline.
- Beth Thomas, a licensed social worker with the Air Force Family Advocacy Program, interviewed Jordan and family about alleged abuse several months before the death and later provided counseling.
- Two other witnesses, AD (Jordan’s half-sister) and Uechi (who found Jordan), gave statements about DeLeon’s past punishments; AD later recanted some statements.
- DeLeon was convicted of second-degree murder and assault with 30-year and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences, respectively, to run concurrently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confrontation Clause violation from Jordan's statements to Thomas | DeLeon argues statements were testimonial and violative. | DeLeon argues statements were testimonial to prosecute. | Statements were nontestimonial; no Confrontation Clause violation. |
| Admission of Thomas, Uechi, and AD hearsay under Rule 803/807 | Hearsay should be admissible as medical/treatment or residual. | Hearsay violations prejudiced defense. | Rulings admitted; no reversible error; harmless in context. |
| Limitation of defense expert's redirect testimony | Expert needed broader scope to defend theory of accident. | District court limited scope to disclosed opinion. | No abuse of discretion; ruling within trial court's discretion. |
| Admissibility of prior acts of corporal punishment under Rule 404(b) | Prior acts show identity, motive, mental state. | Used improperly to show bad character. | Properly admitted for permissible purposes; not abuse of discretion. |
| Jordan's age as a sentencing factor versus an element | Age should be element requiring jury finding. | Age is sentencing factor to be found by judge by preponderance. | Age is a sentencing factor under § 3559(f), not an element; district court proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial vs. non-testimonial statements)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (U.S. 2006) (primary purpose of interrogation; ongoing emergency)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2011) (emergency context and primary purpose test clarified)
- United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (treatment vs. testimonial purpose in child statements)
- United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998) (residual hearsay in child abuse cases and trustworthiness)