United States v. Del-Valle-Cruz
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5507
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- In 1997 Del Valle‑Cruz was convicted in Oklahoma of sexual battery against a 15‑year‑old and required to register as a sex offender; he was released in 2001.
- He later moved among states, repeatedly failed to register, and was federally indicted in 2012 under SORNA (18 U.S.C. § 2250) for failing to register after moving to Puerto Rico.
- He pled guilty with an appeal‑waiver clause and was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment and seven years supervised release; the district court imposed multiple boilerplate special conditions (sex‑offender treatment including polygraph/PPG; no contact with minors; no residence with minors; no work/volunteering with minors).
- Del Valle‑Cruz has a young son (about nine at sentencing) and objected at sentencing to the lack of justification for the special conditions; he nevertheless filed an appeal despite the waiver.
- After the appeal was filed, Oklahoma (citing Starkey) informed him he no longer needed to register under state law; Del Valle‑Cruz argued this undermined the federal SORNA charge.
- The First Circuit considered: (1) whether the appeal waiver bars review of the conviction and conditions; (2) whether SORNA still required registration; and (3) whether the no‑minor/contact‑with‑child conditions and sex‑offender treatment were lawful and justified.
Issues
| Issue | Del Valle‑Cruz's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of federal failure‑to‑register conviction given Oklahoma’s Starkey decision | Oklahoma’s retroactive lifetime registration was unconstitutional, so his state registration duty had expired and he couldn’t be guilty under SORNA | SORNA’s duty to register is triggered by the underlying sex‑offense conviction and sets federal minimum registration periods (15 years tier I), independent of state reclassification | Waiver enforced for conviction; SORNA duty existed (federal law controls), so no miscarriage of justice to allow waiver to bar review of conviction |
| Enforceability of the appeal waiver as to supervised‑release conditions | Waiver should not bar review where enforcing it would cause a miscarriage of justice, particularly for conditions affecting parental rights | Waiver should be enforced; conditions were within district court’s discretion | Waiver enforced as to sex‑offender treatment and restrictions on working/volunteering with minors; waiver not enforced for conditions that barred personal contact with or residing with minors because that implicated a fundamental parental liberty interest and lacked justification |
| Reasonableness and justification for no‑contact / no‑reside conditions with minors | Conditions are unsupported by record: underlying SORNA offense isn’t a sex offense per se, underlying sex offense was remote (18 years), no subsequent sex‑offense conduct, and no individualized findings were made — condition interferes with his right to parent | Conditions relate to his original sex conviction and history of failing to register; probation can supervise and approve contacts | Conditions prohibiting personal contact with minors and residing with minors (conditions 13 and 15) vacated for lack of case‑specific factual findings and because they are more restrictive than reasonably necessary; remand for de novo resentencing limited to supervised release so court can justify conditions |
| Imposition of sex‑offender treatment (including PPG) | (Argued minimally) court gave no explanation and treatment (esp. PPG) is highly intrusive and requires justification | Government: treatment and testing are standard, relate to deterrence, rehabilitation and public safety | Waiver enforced as to sex‑offender treatment given circuit precedent (Morales‑Cruz); court notes Medina concerns about PPG and invites district court to revisit conditions on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Teeter v. United States, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (three‑part test for validity of appeal waivers)
- Santiago v. United States, 769 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (miscarriage‑of‑justice standard for refusing to enforce waiver)
- Morales‑Cruz v. United States, 712 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding sex‑offender treatment conditions in comparable SORNA context)
- Perazza‑Mercado v. United States, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009) (district courts must provide reasoned, case‑specific findings for special conditions)
- Medina v. United States, 779 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015) (PPG testing is highly intrusive; courts must give substantial justification when objected to)
- Mercado v. United States, 777 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (detailed, case‑specific explanation can justify restrictive conditions when tied to history and noncompliance)
- Goodwin v. United States, 717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2013) (vacating blank‑justified no‑contact‑with‑minors condition)
- Bear v. United States, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) (vacating broad no‑contact/residence restrictions where underlying sex offense was remote)
- Voelker v. United States, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (vacating condition that delegated unbounded authority to probation to approve minor contacts)
- Davis v. United States, 452 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2006) (requiring individualized findings before restricting parental contact)