United States v. Dearnta Thomas, 87 F.4th 267

Dearnta Lavon Thomas, a gang leader, pleaded guilty (2011) to racketeering and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), with the predicate charged as VICAR (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)) assault with a dangerous weapon.
He received concurrent racketeering time and the mandatory 10-year minimum under § 924(c); collateral § 2255 motions followed after changes in Supreme Court law.
The Supreme Court invalidated residual-style crime-of-violence clauses (Johnson; Dimaya; Davis), leaving only the force/elements clause, and later required a mens rea greater than recklessness for predicate offenses (Borden).
Thomas sought relief arguing VICAR assault could not satisfy the narrowed § 924(c) definition because the VICAR offense was predicated on Virginia firearm-brandishing statutes that, he contended, were not crimes of violence.
The district court denied relief; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the proper predicate is the VICAR offense itself (no categorical "look-through" to state predicates is required when the federal VICAR element suffices) and (2) VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon satisfies both the force clause and Borden's mens rea requirement.

Issue	Thomas's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Proper analytical framework: whether to "look through" VICAR to underlying state predicates when assessing a § 924(c) crime-of-violence predicate	VICAR is derivative; courts must examine the underlying state-law predicates to determine if they qualify as crimes of violence	When the federal VICAR element (assault with a dangerous weapon) itself satisfies § 924(c), no look-through is required	The court declined a mandatory look-through; if the federal VICAR element satisfies § 924(c), that is sufficient
Sufficiency of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon as a § 924(c) predicate after Davis and Borden	The VICAR predicate fails because its underlying state firearm offenses are not crimes of violence; residual clause invalidation undermines the § 924(c) conviction	VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon necessarily involves violent force (dangerous-weapon element) and requires purposeful/intentional conduct to further racketeering, satisfying Borden	The court held VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies: dangerous-weapon element supplies violent force and VICAR's purpose element supplies the required mens rea

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidated residual clause of ACCA as unconstitutionally vague)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied Johnson to invalidate a similar federal residual clause)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated § 924(c)'s residual clause)
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (held predicate offenses require mens rea greater than recklessness)
United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020) (dangerous-weapon enhancement converts assault into a crime of violence under the force clause)
Manners v. United States, 947 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2020) (held VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon satisfies the force clause)
In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2021) (authorized successive § 2255 based on Davis retroactivity)
United States v. Manley, 52 F.4th 143 (4th Cir. 2022) (discussed VICAR elements and their application)
United States v. Keene, 955 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2020) (analysis of when to look to indictments/plea to identify statutory alternatives)
United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (use of the categorical approach to determine § 924(c) predicates)