United States v. Dean Doutt, 926 F.3d 244

Dean Doutt pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography after attempting to obtain images via a video-conferencing app that was monitored by the government.
Before pleading guilty, Doutt admitted in a polygraph interview to sexual activity with a neighborhood boy, M.R., beginning when Doutt was 16 and M.R. was “a year or two younger,” later recalled as 11 or 12; encounters continued for several years.
At sentencing the government sought a Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” relying on 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (criminalizing sexual activity with minors 12–15 when perpetrator is at least four years older).
The district court applied the § 2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement based solely on Doutt’s statement that he was 16 and M.R. was about 11–12, concluding Doutt was at least four years older than M.R.
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court used the wrong legal standard: “at least four years” must be calculated in days/months (i.e., at least 1,461 days or 48 months), not by comparing whole years, and the record lacked sufficient evidence to make that precise calculation.
The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing; it allowed the government to present new evidence on remand because the district court had applied the wrong legal standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Doutt)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether the § 2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement applies by comparing whole years of age (e.g., 16 vs. 12)	The record does not establish a 4‑year difference; whole-year subtraction is insufficient and may be inaccurate	The court may infer a >=4‑year difference from Doutt’s statement that he was 16 and M.R. was 11–12	The court held the correct metric is days/months (≥1,461 days or 48 months); whole‑year subtraction is erroneous
Whether Doutt preserved his challenge to the enhancement	Doutt preserved his objection by arguing a possible three‑year age difference	Government contends plain‑error review applies because objection wasn’t precise	Court applied de novo review—Doutt’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue
Whether the government may introduce new evidence on remand to show the precise age gap	Doutt implied new evidence would be unfair	Government argued remand should not allow new proof but can rely on existing record	Court permitted the government to introduce new evidence because the district court used the wrong legal standard
Whether § 2243 applies given uncertainty whether M.R. was 11 or 12	If M.R. was 11, § 2243 does not apply (another statute would)	Government assumed § 2243 applied based on M.R. being 12	Court confined analysis to § 2243 because record did not show M.R. was more likely 11 than 12

United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for guideline interpretation)
United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2014) (adopts days/months approach to calculate multi‑year age differences)
United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2014) (uses days/months standard for age‑difference statutes)
Esquivel‑Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (definitional context for statutory age‑difference language)
United States v. Goodman, 519 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 2008) (discusses introduction of new evidence on remand)
United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009) (allowing new evidence on remand when prior proceedings applied incorrect legal standard)