United States v. Davis (Johnson)
732 F.3d 109
| 2d Cir. | 2013

Background

  • In 2009 Matthew Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy involving 150–500 grams of cocaine base; statutory mandatory minimum then was 10 years (120 months).
  • Plea agreement contemplated government motion for substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)/U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; the government moved and the district court reduced Johnson’s offense level by two levels (from 29 to 27) and sentenced him to 87 months (low end of level 27, CHC III).
  • The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA, 2010) raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds and the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendments 748/750 (reducing base offense levels) and Amendment 759 (making them retroactive under § 1B1.10).
  • Johnson moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 750. He argued his adjusted level should drop to 23 (yielding 57–71 months) after applying the same 2-level substantial-assistance reduction to the amended guideline.
  • The Probation Office and the district court treated the mandatory 120-month statutory minimum as still applicable, computed a pre-departure guideline level of 28 (CHC III) that included the mandatory minimum, applied a comparable 2-level reduction to that level, and reduced Johnson’s sentence to 78 months.
  • On appeal Johnson argued (1) he was eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, (2) the § 3553(e) departure displaces the statutory minimum for guideline calculations, and (3) the FSA’s lower mandatory minimum (five years) should apply in the § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson) Defendant's Argument (Govt/Court) Held
1) Was Johnson eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief (i.e., was his applicable guideline range "lowered")? Amendment 750 lowered his base level so his guideline range was lowered (from 120–135 to 120), triggering § 3582(c)(2). Because the 120‑month statutory minimum still constrained the guideline, the Commission would not view the applicable guideline range as lowered; eligibility denied if minimum remains. Held: Not eligible if the 120‑month statutory minimum remains applicable; the apparent change (120–135 to 120) is not a Commission‑recognized lowering.
2) Does a § 3553(e)/5K1.1 substantial‑assistance departure displace the statutory mandatory minimum for guideline calculations? The two‑level departure effectively "waived" or displaced the mandatory minimum for guideline computation. A substantial‑assistance departure does not displace statutory mandatory minima for purposes of determining eligibility under § 3582(c)(2). Held: Rejected Johnson’s displacement argument; mandatory minimum remains for guideline calculations.
3) Does the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced mandatory minimum apply retroactively in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding for a defendant sentenced before Aug. 3, 2010? Even if the 120‑month minimum applies, the FSA reduced that minimum to 60 months, which should apply. Dorsey and Dillon show § 3582(c)(2) is a limited, non‑resentencing proceeding; the FSA does not apply retroactively in § 3582(c)(2) reductions for defendants sentenced before Aug. 3, 2010. Held: FSA does not apply to Johnson in the § 3582(c)(2) proceeding; his pre‑FSA mandatory minimum remains.
4) Proper calculation of post‑Amendment and post‑departure guideline level The 2‑level substantial‑assistance reduction should be applied to the amended pre‑departure level (25), yielding level 23 and range 57–71 months. The Commission requires computing the amended “applicable guideline range” before departures; because the statutory minimum controls, the comparable 2‑level reduction is applied to level 28, yielding level 26 and range 78–97 months. Held: Court used level 26 (78 months low end); Johnson not entitled to the deeper reduction he sought.

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting theory that a substantial‑assistance departure displaces statutory minimum for § 3582 purposes)
  • Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (FSA applies to offenders sentenced after Aug. 3, 2010, but distinguishes sentencing from § 3582(c)(2) reductions)
  • Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes limited modification of a final sentence, not plenary resentencing)
  • United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (avoidance of absurd results in statutory interpretation)
  • Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (cross‑appeal rule limits appellate courts from increasing sentences absent government cross‑appeal)
Read the full case