United States v. David McLean
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16918
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- David McLean, a Margate, Florida city commissioner and member of the Margate Community Redevelopment Agency (MCRA), was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 666 for accepting cash and rent forgiveness in exchange for assistance with city licensing and an inflated MCRA grant application; acquitted on Count I, convicted on Counts II & III.
- Government theory: MCRA received federal benefits (directly or indirectly) exceeding $10,000 during the relevant one-year periods (e.g., CDBG and six bus shelters funded with federal stimulus via Broward County), satisfying § 666(b).
- Defense: the record lacked proof that MCRA received over $10,000 in federal funds in the charged periods; key MCRA witness (Holste) testified MCRA never directly received federal dollars and was unsure of the federal origin/amount for bus shelters.
- District Court granted judgment of acquittal post-verdict, finding insufficient evidence that MCRA received qualifying federal benefits within the indictment timeframes; Eleventh Circuit reviews sufficiency de novo.
- McLean also cross-appealed denial of his motion to strike the government’s untimely response to post-trial motions under local rule; the district court declined to strike and considered the response.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government proved § 666(b) jurisdictional element (MCRA received >$10,000 federal benefits during relevant one-year periods) | Government: evidence (City financial reports, CDBG receipts, bus shelters built with federal stimulus via county, MCRA budget entries) sufficed to let a reasonable jury find federal benefit | McLean: evidence was too indirect and speculative; key witness conceded MCRA never directly received federal funds and could not identify amounts or program structure | Held: Insufficient evidence. Acquittal affirmed — government failed to show a nexus between federal program’s structure/operation/purpose and MCRA’s receipt/use such that funds qualified as § 666(b) benefits |
| Whether classification of an item as a “benefit” under § 666 is a question of law or fact | Government: characterization of benefits is legal and for the court (invoked after trial) | McLean: the issue was submitted to jury and is intertwined with substantive elements; jury determination appropriate | Held: Court need not resolve abstractly (government invited the issue); under Eleventh Circuit precedent, submission to the jury was proper and no reversible error was shown |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by denying motion to strike government’s late response under Local Rule 7.1(c) | McLean: government’s response was one week late; Rule permits default grant and the district court should have struck or granted relief by default | Government: Rule does not mandate striking; district court may consider late opposition and hear argument; no prejudice shown | Held: No abuse of discretion. Denial of motion to strike affirmed |
| Standard of review for renewed motion for judgment of acquittal | Government: district court erred by not viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict and drawing reasonable inferences for jury | McLean: district court correctly applied de novo sufficiency review and granted judgment of acquittal because evidence could not support any reasonable jury finding of federal benefit | Held: Affirmed district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal after independent review — government did not meet its burden beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (federal courts cannot create federal common law crimes)
- United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (punishment and crime definition are legislative functions)
- Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (federal crimes are creatures of statute)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (§ 666 does not require that bribe affect federal funds)
- Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (to qualify as a § 666 “benefit,” examine the federal program’s structure, operation, and purpose; § 666 has constitutional limits)
- Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (Congress may legislate under Spending Clause to protect integrity of federal funds; no nexus required between bribe and federal funds)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (caution against expansive readings of federal criminal statutes)
- United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.) (§ 666 requires proof that the agent’s employer received >$10,000 in federal funds in connection with programs of sufficient structure/operation/purpose)
- United States v. Jackson, 313 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.) (government must prove receipt in relevant period; documentary proof can be important)
- United States v. Zyskind, 118 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.) (indirect receipt of federal funds can qualify under § 666)
- United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119 (9th Cir.) (statute was not intended to sweep in institutions that do not themselves receive and administer federal funds)