920 F.3d 395
6th Cir.2019Background
- Defendant David Armstrong sold heroin to a confidential informant during three controlled buys; he pleaded guilty to one distribution count and faced sentencing on relevant conduct.
- Each controlled buy involved about one gram of heroin for $140; the informant told police she had purchased one gram from Armstrong ~70 times over 18–24 months.
- Probation and the Government used the informant’s 70-gram estimate to calculate an enhanced Guidelines range; Armstrong argued he only sold small amounts a few times.
- At the sentencing hearing neither Armstrong nor the informant testified; the court admitted and considered out-of-court statements and officer testimony about the informant’s prior purchases.
- The district court found the informant’s statements reliable (corroborated by the three one-gram buys and lack of motive to exaggerate) and sentenced Armstrong to 37 months.
- On appeal Armstrong argued the informant’s hearsay was insufficiently corroborated, her identity was undisclosed without good cause, and the court therefore erred in inflating his Guidelines range.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability of informant hearsay for sentencing | Gov: District courts may rely on hearsay with a minimal indicia of reliability; corroboration by controlled buys suffices | Armstrong: Informant’s claim of ~70 purchases lacked particularized corroboration and was unreliable | Court: Affirmed; minimal indicia of reliability met—three corroborated one-gram buys plus informant’s lack of motive justified crediting her statements |
| Standard for relying on unidentified informant | Gov: Even unidentified informant hearsay may be used if there is good cause for nondisclosure and sufficient corroboration | Armstrong: District court failed to show good cause and did not sufficiently corroborate the 70-purchase claim | Court: No reversible error; defendant knew informant’s identity and chose not to call her; corroboration requirement satisfied; plain-error review raised no obvious error |
| Burden of corroboration | Gov: "Sufficient corroboration" requires adequate, not exhaustive, corroboration to meet the low indicia-of-reliability standard | Armstrong: Corroboration must match specific quantity/time assertions | Court: "Sufficient" means adequate; particularized corroboration of every detail not required; Rogers and Guidelines commentary support this view |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (hearsay admissible at sentencing with minimal indicia of reliability)
- United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing corroboration and informant testimony at sentencing)
- United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing indicia-of-reliability standard as relatively low)
- United States v. Gibson, 985 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1993) (appellate standard of review for sentencing factfindings is clearly erroneous)
- United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (standard for reversal under clear-error review)
- United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussion of appellate review standards)
- United States v. Rogers, 1 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1993) (sufficient corroboration can justify reliance on unidentified informant without corroborating every specific amount)
- United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversal where hearsay was conjectural and source of informant’s knowledge was unexplained)
