986 F.3d 1206
9th Cir.2021Background
- In 2017 Hudson was found sharing child pornography; agents recovered >135,000 images and >1,100 videos. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
- Hudson had a prior California conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) (lewd and lascivious act with a child under 14). The government sought the § 2252(b)(2) ten-year mandatory minimum based on that prior conviction.
- The district court applied Ninth Circuit precedent (United States v. Farmer) holding that § 288(a) categorically involves sexual abuse and therefore triggers the enhancement, and imposed the ten-year mandatory minimum.
- Hudson conceded Farmer applied but argued § 2252(b)(2)’s phrase “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” is unconstitutionally vague; he asked instead for an 87-month sentence (Guidelines low-end).
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague and whether the prior conviction supports the enhancement, and ultimately affirmed the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hudson) | Defendant's Argument (U.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2252(b)(2)’s phrase referencing crimes “relating to ... abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” is unconstitutionally vague | The phrase gives insufficient notice and invites arbitrary enforcement because the court applies two definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor” and a broad “relating to” gloss | The phrase has settled, objective meaning under the categorical approach and Ninth Circuit precedent; the “relating to” language has limits and does not require speculation about an ordinary case | Not unconstitutionally vague; challenge rejected |
| Whether a prior conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) qualifies as a predicate for § 2252(b)(2) enhancement | (Hudson did not contest Farmer’s holding; he sought to avoid enhancement via vagueness challenge) | Farmer and subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions treat § 288(a) as categorically involving sexual abuse of a minor, so it qualifies | § 288(a) qualifies; enhancement properly applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (vacated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (struck down similar residual clause in immigration statute)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (applied Johnson/Dimaya to § 924(c) residual clause)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established categorical approach)
- Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (caution on overbroad readings of predicate definitions)
- United States v. Farmer, 627 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2010) (held Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) categorically involves sexual abuse)
- United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpreted “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” and applying "relating to")
- United States v. Jaycox, 962 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) (clarified limits of “relating to”)
- United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2018) (narrower reading for child-pornography–related predicates where statutory definitions exist)
- United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (categorical-approach foundations in chapter 110 analyses)