United States v. Daryle Sellers
906 F.3d 848
9th Cir.2018Background
- Sellers was arrested in an ATF "stash house" reverse-sting operation and convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery; he appealed the denial of discovery on a selective enforcement claim.
- Stash-house reverse-stings: undercover agents (with confidential informants) recruit targets to plan a robbery of a fictitious drug stash house; arrests occur before any real crime exists.
- Sellers proffered statistical evidence showing a large racial disparity in stash-house prosecutions in the district (majority Black or Hispanic; very few white defendants) and Agent Carr testified similarly nationwide.
- The district court denied discovery applying the Armstrong selective-prosecution discovery standard; Sellers appealed that denial.
- The Ninth Circuit majority held Armstrong’s rigorous discovery standard for selective prosecution does not strictly apply to selective enforcement claims in stash-house reverse-sting cases and remanded for the district court to apply a more flexible, case-specific discovery gatekeeping analysis.
- The court emphasized two material differences from selective prosecution: (1) law-enforcement agents lack the same presumption of regularity and privileges afforded prosecutors; (2) comparative statistics identifying similarly situated non-targeted individuals typically do not exist in reverse-sting contexts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for discovery on a selective enforcement claim arising from stash-house reverse-stings | Sellers argued Armstrong’s selective-prosecution discovery standard is too strict because agents, not prosecutors, do the targeting and comparative data are unavailable; he sought discovery based on racial disparity evidence | Government argued Armstrong applies and Sellers’ raw statistics are insufficient to warrant discovery | Court held Armstrong’s rigorous discovery standard for selective prosecution does not strictly apply; district courts should exercise discretion and may permit discovery on a lower, case-specific showing in stash-house reverse-sting cases |
| Whether Sellers’ proffered statistics alone warranted discovery | Sellers argued the district statistics and agent testimony raised an inference of discriminatory effect sufficient to obtain discovery | Government argued raw, non-comparative statistics are irrelevant and insufficient | Court did not decide whether Sellers’ specific proffer was ultimately sufficient; remanded to district court to apply the flexible standard and determine if discovery is warranted |
| Need to show similarly situated non-targeted persons | Sellers: impossible in reverse-sting context and should not be required for initial discovery | Government: comparable individuals are required (per Armstrong/Bass) to show discriminatory effect | Court held requiring proof of similarly situated non-targeted persons at the discovery threshold is often infeasible in reverse-sting cases and therefore not a prerequisite to all discovery requests |
| Scope of permissible discovery | Sellers sought agent/supervisor materials on targeting practices and demographics | Government argued such discovery is unwarranted absent Armstrong-level showing | Court held district courts have discretion to fashion limited or broad discovery based on reliability/strength of the defendant’s showing; in-camera review and tailored discovery are options |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (Sup. Ct.) (rigorous discovery standard for selective prosecution claims)
- United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (held Armstrong is not dispositive for selective enforcement in stash-house stings and permitted broader discovery)
- United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (applied flexible discovery approach for selective enforcement in reverse-sting cases)
- United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussed difficulties of obtaining comparative evidence in stash-house context)
- United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (Sup. Ct.) (raw, non-comparative statistics insufficient to show discriminatory effect)
