United States v. Darryl Lee, 793 F.3d 680

Darryl Lee, an Ohio parolee with prior weapons convictions, was subject to parole conditions allowing warrantless searches under Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.131(C). He signed and acknowledged those conditions.
On Dec. 21, 2013 Lee was arrested for felony drug possession and reported the arrest to his parole officer, James Campana; Campana imposed a unit sanction and continued supervision.
On Jan. 29, 2014 Campana received a tip (via another parole officer and an off-duty Youngstown police officer) that residents reported "possible weapons going in and out" of Lee’s apartment; Campana did not independently corroborate the tip.
On Jan. 30, 2014 Campana and other officers went to Lee’s apartment; Lee’s girlfriend, Joshulen Harrison, let them in; officers handcuffed and frisked Lee in the living room.
Campana asked if there was anything in the apartment Lee should not have; Lee replied, “No. Go ahead and look.” Parole officers searched and found cash, drug paraphernalia, and a 9mm handgun; Lee was arrested and later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Lee moved to suppress; the district court denied the motion on two alternative grounds—consent (entry by Harrison and search consent by Lee) and reasonable suspicion—Lee pleaded guilty conditionally and appealed the suppression denial.

Issue	Lee's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Validity of Harrison's consent to entry	Harrison’s consent invalid because officers didn’t disclose intent to search; consent was induced	Harrison was authorized resident; officers identified; no deceptive ruse; consent valid	Entry consent valid; district court not clearly erroneous
Validity of Lee’s consent to search	Consent involuntary because Lee was handcuffed/frisked and entry was illegal	Handcuffed status alone doesn’t vitiate consent; Lee’s verbal consent was voluntary and similar to precedents	Lee’s consent to search was voluntary; district court not clearly erroneous
Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to search	The tip + drug arrest + history sufficed to establish reasonable suspicion	Same facts support reasonable grounds under parole statute	Court expressed grave doubt that reasonable suspicion existed but did not decide because consent sufficed
Admissibility of seized evidence	Evidence should be suppressed as product of unconstitutional search	Evidence admissible due to valid consent (and alternatively reasonable suspicion)	Suppression denied; conviction affirmed

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent voluntariness judged under totality of circumstances)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (probationer searches need only reasonable suspicion under totality of circumstances)
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (when anonymous tips provide indicia of reliability for reasonable suspicion)
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (anonymous tip corroborated by police can support reasonable suspicion)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (government must prove consent was voluntary)
United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597 (consent factual finding not clearly erroneous where consent was clear and brief detention)
United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906 (handcuffing does not automatically invalidate consent)
United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584 (entry consent upheld despite initial misrepresentation when officers were identifiable)
United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781 (tip plus criminal history may be insufficient for reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516 (upholding constitutionality of Ohio’s parole search statute)