United States v. Darrell Duncan
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14887
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Darrell Duncan, a felon and unlawful drug user, pled guilty to possession of a firearm and faced an ACCA enhancement based on three prior Indiana robbery convictions.
- Indiana robbery statute (Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1) criminalizes taking property either by (1) using or threatening force, or (2) by putting a person in fear.
- District court treated Duncan’s prior Indiana robbery convictions as ACCA violent felonies and imposed the 15-year mandatory minimum.
- The sole legal question on appeal: whether Indiana robbery "by putting a person in fear" necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another, satisfying ACCA’s elements clause.
- The court applied the categorical approach and examined Indiana case law to determine what “putting in fear” requires (i.e., fear of bodily injury and an implicit or explicit threat of physical force).
Issues
| Issue | Duncan's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Indiana robbery (including the "putting in fear" prong) has as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force under ACCA § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) | "Putting in fear" does not necessarily require threatened/used physical force, so convictions under § 35-42-5-1 may not satisfy ACCA elements clause | Indiana law requires fear of bodily injury produced by an explicit or implicit threat of physical force; thus robbery-by-fear meets the elements clause | Affirmed: Indiana robbery by fear requires fear of bodily injury produced by an explicit or implicit threat of physical force and qualifies as an ACCA violent felony |
| Whether the required fear of "bodily injury" is too minimal (e.g., bruise or slight pain) to satisfy Curtis Johnson’s "physical force" requirement | A fear of minor injury (as low as bruise/pain) is insufficient to qualify as the physical force required by ACCA | Curtis Johnson defines "physical force" as force capable of causing physical pain or injury (a low threshold such as a slap suffices); Indiana’s bodily injury standard meets that | Held: Indiana’s bodily injury standard suffices; minor pain can meet ACCA physical force standard |
| Whether Indiana robbery could be prosecuted on fringe hypotheticals (irrational phobias) such that categorical approach fails | Hypothetical outlier victims (irrational fears) could produce convictions without a threat of physical force, so statute is overbroad for categorical approach | Courts apply the categorical approach to the ordinary case; hypothetical outliers do not defeat a statute that ordinarily requires a threat of physical force | Held: Court considers ordinary case; hypothetical outliers are insufficient to defeat categorical-match conclusion |
| Whether prior precedent (United States v. Lewis) survives after invalidation of the residual clause | Duncan: Lewis relied on the now-invalid residual clause, so it no longer supports treating robbery-by-fear as an elements-clause predicate | Lewis explicitly held that Indiana robbery (including robbery by fear) satisfies the elements clause as well as the residual clause; that portion remains good law | Held: Lewis’ elements-clause reasoning survives and supports treating Indiana robbery as an ACCA predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" in ACCA means force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for determining predicate offenses)
- United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2005) (held Indiana robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under elements clause)
- Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Indiana "bodily injury" threshold as low; even slight pain suffices)
- United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (elements clauses of ACCA and Guidelines treated equivalently)