United States v. Darius Chaney, 911 F.3d 222

In 2003 Darius Chaney pleaded guilty to carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), using a firearm in a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), with a plea waiver of post-conviction challenges (except ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct).
At sentencing the court imposed concurrent terms on the substantive counts (180 and 188 months) and an 84-month mandatory consecutive § 924(c) sentence, for an aggregate of 272 months; prior North Carolina break-and-enter convictions were used as predicate felonies and to enhance sentences.
After this court's decision in United States v. Simmons (2011), Chaney moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing his NC convictions were not federal felonies, so his § 922(g)(1) conviction and related enhancements were invalid.
The government conceded Chaney was actually innocent of § 922(g)(1) and waived defenses for that count only; the district court vacated the § 922(g)(1) conviction but declined to resentence the carjacking conviction and reimposed the prior sentences on the remaining counts.
Chaney appealed 54 days after the amended judgment (beyond the 14-day criminal appeal period but within the 60-day civil appeal period); the court considered (1) whether the appeal was untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) and (2) whether the district court abused its § 2255 remedial discretion by not ordering full resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of appeal (which rule governs)	Chaney: § 2255 is civil so Rule 4(a) 60-day period applies; appeal timely.	Gov't: Corrected criminal judgment is appealable as a new criminal sentence under Rule 4(b) 14-day period; late.	Dismissed as untimely under Rule 4(b) (appeal challenges relief and thus a new criminal sentence).
Nature of amended judgment after § 2255	Chaney: Amended judgment is part of § 2255 civil proceeding.	Gov't: Amended judgment that imposes a new sentence is part of the criminal case.	Court (citing Hadden): Such orders are hybrid; appeals challenging the relief (new sentence) are appeals of a criminal judgment.
Whether district court abused § 2255 remedial discretion by not resentencing carjacking count	Chaney: Vacatur of § 922(g)(1) required full resentencing under sentence-package theory.	Gov't & district court: Court can ‘‘correct’’ sentence under § 2255(b) without full resentencing; waiver and limitations bear on relief.	No abuse of discretion: court permissibly vacated § 922(g)(1) and left other sentences in place.
Effect of plea waiver and government’s limited waiver on relief	Chaney: Waiver shouldn’t prevent district court from exercising remedial authority to resentence.	Gov't: Waiver and its limited explicit waiver for § 922(g)(1) are relevant to remedial scope.	Court: Plea waiver and gov’t position were legitimate considerations; not error to decline full resentencing.

United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652 (4th Cir. 2007) (amended judgments after § 2255 are hybrid; relief challenging new sentence is an appeal of a criminal judgment)
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (North Carolina convictions of the type at issue are not federal felonies because they are not punishable by >1 year)
Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (habeas is civil in nature)
United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2017) (timeliness of criminal appeals and dismissal for untimely filings)
United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1997) (district courts have broad and flexible remedial power under § 2255)
United States v. Smith, 115 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (sentence-package theory permitting resentencing on all counts in appropriate circumstances)
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (procedural time limits in appellate rules are non-jurisdictional and may be relaxed in discretion)