United States v. Dante Jones
739 F.3d 364
7th Cir.2014Background
- Robert R. Brown convicted by jury of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 2113(a)/(d) and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
- This stemmed from the Guaranty Bank robbery in Milwaukee on October 21, 2010; Dante Jones testified against Brown in exchange for charges dropped and a reduced sentence elsewhere.
- Evidence showed two masked men entered the bank, one brandishing a gun; dye packs and a dye-stained bag were recovered near the bank and later; no fingerprints identified the robbers.
- Jones testified about the plan and Brown’s role; surveillance footage corroborated some elements; defense highlighted Jones’s incentives to lie.
- Brown challenged Detective Spano’s testimony on dye packs as expert under Rule 701/702; Brown challenged jury instructions and several closing arguments as improper.
- Jones, having pled guilty, appeals only his sentence, arguing a career offender designation and lack of full application of § 5K1.1 substantial assistance reduction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Spano’s dye-pack testimony was improper expert testimony | Spano’s dye-pack facts were expert testimony. | Testimony was lay; failure to disclose/qualify was error. | Some dye-pack testimony was expert; harmless overall; no plain error. |
| Whether dye-pack expert testimony violated Rule 701/702 and plain error standard | Dye-pack testimony required expert disclosure. | Testimony respected through lay testimony where appropriate; no prejudice. | Harmless error; no miscarriage of justice; no plain error. |
| Whether jury instructions improperly reduced the government's burden via joint-venture framing | Instructions may have misdirected on aiding/abetting liability and firearm-use element. | Knowledge element required; Brown aided and abetted; no plain error since knowledge not in dispute. | No plain error; instructions adequately instructed aiding/abetting liability. |
| Whether closing arguments deprived Brown of a fair trial | Prosecutor's statements were improper in multiple respects. | Most statements were proper; one error as to credibility evidence; trial court instruction mitigated. | Overall not plain error; one improper credibility comment de minimis. |
| Whether Jones’s sentence as a career offender with § 5K1.1 substantial assistance was reasonably determined | Jones argues full career-offender enhancement and no § 5K1.1 reduction; sentence too high. | District court properly weighed career offender status, § 5K1.1, and substantial assistance to impose 100 months. | District court properly varied; sentence within reasonable bounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mendiola, 707 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2013) (distinguishes lay vs. expert testimony under Rule 701)
- United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishes expert testimony requiring disclosure under Rule 702)
- United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2012) (lay vs. expert testimony and reliance on officer experience)
- United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013) (discusses plain-error standard and limitations)
- United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2013) (presumes reasonableness for sentences within Guidelines)
- United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2008) (district courts may reject guideline advice, including career offender status)