United States v. Daniel Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175

In 2007 Wirsing was indicted; he pleaded guilty in 2008 to felon-in-possession (Count 10) and possession with intent to distribute ~16 g of cocaine base (Count 14). The parties stipulated relevant conduct of 60.135 g.
Sentenced as a career offender under the 2007 Guidelines to 188 months on Count 14 (guideline range driven by career-offender rules and a 40-year statutory maximum then applicable).
After the First Step Act (2018) Wirsing moved in 2019 for a reduced sentence under § 404, arguing he is eligible because his statute of conviction (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) as then charged) was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
The district court denied relief by applying 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and focusing on the stipulated 60.135 g relevant conduct (concluding the Guidelines range would not be lowered).
The Government later agreed Wirsing was eligible but advanced an alternative theory (look to offense conduct attributable to the count rather than the statute of conviction).
The Fourth Circuit reversed: (1) § 3582(c)(1)(B) — not § 3582(c)(2) — is the proper vehicle for First Step Act motions; and (2) “covered offense” is determined by the statute of conviction (statute-of-conviction theory), so defendants convicted under the statutory provisions modified by the Fair Sentencing Act may seek reductions. The case was remanded for reconsideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wirsing)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Proper procedural vehicle for First Step Act motions	First Step Act expressly permits courts to impose reduced sentences; such motions fit § 3582(c)(1)(B)	District court: analogous to Fair Sentencing Act/Guidelines amendments so § 3582(c)(2) should apply	Held: § 3582(c)(1)(B) is the correct vehicle because the First Step Act itself "expressly permits" modification
Definition of “covered offense” (eligibility)	A “covered offense” is a conviction under a federal statute whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act (statute-of-conviction)	The phrase refers to a particular "violation" and should be tied to the offense conduct attributable to the count	Held: Adopt statute-of-conviction interpretation; defendants convicted under statutory provisions changed by the Fair Sentencing Act may move for relief
Applicability when sentence driven by career-offender/relevant conduct	Wirsing: Even if career-offender status influenced the Guidelines, he remains eligible because his statute of conviction was modified	Government: Eligibility should depend on whether relevant-conduct quantity would change statutory range	Held: Eligibility is determined by the statute of conviction; district court must exercise discretion on resentencing after eligibility is established

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (discussed the crack/powder sentencing disparity and judge’s ability to vary from Guidelines)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (held Fair Sentencing Act applies to offenders sentenced after its effective date)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (held the Sentencing Guidelines advisory)
United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572 (4th Cir.) (analyzed § 3582(c)(2) in the context of Fair Sentencing Act–related Guidelines amendments)
United States v. Black, 737 F.3d 280 (4th Cir.) (explained effect of Fair Sentencing Act in reducing the crack-to-powder ratio)
United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.) (interpreting "expressly permits" language for sentence modification statutes)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (explained statutory limits on § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions)
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (canon of the last antecedent applied in statutory parsing)
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (statutory interpretation principles confirming reliance on ordinary grammar/context)
United States v. Muldrow, 844 F.3d 434 (4th Cir.) (on limitations of § 3582(c)(2) where Guidelines amendments did not lower the defendant’s applicable range)