United States v. Daniel Mathis
932 F.3d 242
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Members and leaders of the Double Nine Goon Syndikate (DNGS), a Bloods set, were tried and convicted of a RICO conspiracy and related violent offenses after a multi-week jury trial; four defendants (Mathis, Shantai, Mersadies, Kweli) received life sentences for crimes tied to the murder of off‑duty officer Kevin Quick.
- Facts proved at trial: DNGS structure and rules, drug distribution and violent offenses to "put in work," armed robberies and burglaries, and the January 31, 2014 kidnapping, ATM withdrawal, and murder of Quick.
- Post-murder conduct included attempts to destroy evidence (vehicle cleaning, disassembling and discarding gun parts, destroying phones and ATM card), travel/flight plans, and communications among DNGS members.
- Procedural history: first trial mistried after a defendant removed a juror list; second trial proceeded with an anonymous jury and convictions on all counts; defendants appealed raising multiple challenges (anonymous jury, hearsay/confrontation, indictment defects/timeliness, sufficiency of evidence, predicate crimes for §924(c), and sentencing).
- Court affirmed most rulings but vacated the §924(c) convictions that rested on Virginia kidnapping predicates and remanded for resentencing of the capital defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of an anonymous jury | Gov: necessary given DNGS violence, juror safety concerns, prior misconduct (juror list taken) | Defs: no evidence they could harm/intimidate jurors | Court: affirmed anonymous jury as justified and safeguards were adopted (no abuse of discretion) |
| Admission of co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) & Confrontation Clause | Gov: statements were made during and in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy and non‑testimonial | Defs: statements not in furtherance; admission violated Crawford/Confrontation Clause | Court: statements admissible as in‑furtherance; non‑testimonial, so no Confrontation Clause violation |
| Timeliness / sufficiency of indictment language on §1512(a)(1)(C) (witness tampering) | Defs: indictment defective because it omitted "of the United States" | Defs: raised motion untimely but seek plain error review | Court: motion untimely (no good cause); indictment adequate to inform charges—no defect |
| Alleged amendment of indictment by jury instruction (enterprise identity) | Defs: instruction replaced "Bloods" with "DNGS," amending indictment | Defs invited the instruction at charging conference | Court: invited‑error bars review; claim not addressed on merits |
| Sufficiency of evidence for RICO conspiracy (enterprise & pattern) | Defs: DNGS not an "enterprise"; crimes were spontaneous/not a pattern | Gov: evidence of ongoing organization, hierarchy, repeated related predicate acts | Court: substantial evidence supported enterprise and pattern; convictions affirmed |
| Sufficiency of §1512(a)(1)(C) witness‑tampering convictions | Defs: underlying federal offense (carjacking) not proven | Gov: §1512 requires prevention of communication about a possible federal offense, not proof of underlying offense | Court: statute requires only prevention of communication about a possible federal offense; convictions sustained |
| §1512(c)(1) obstruction convictions for Halisi & Stokes | Defs: Halisi only ordered others; Stokes argues no federal proceeding was contemplated | Gov: co‑conspirator/vicarious liability and statutory text cover conduct even if proceeding was not pending or federal | Court: Halisi liable under vicarious/co‑conspirator theories; Stokes’ intent to affect foreseeable official proceeding supported; convictions affirmed |
| §924(c) predicate crime classification (force clause) — murder, witness tampering by murder, Hobbs Act robbery, Virginia kidnapping | Defs: some predicates (kidnapping, robbery, murder) do not categorically require force; residual clause invalid (Johnson) | Gov: murder and witness‑tampering by murder qualify; Hobbs Act robbery qualifies; kidnapping under Va. law divisible? | Court: residual clause unconstitutional (Davis) so review under force clause; first‑degree murder and §1512(a)(1)(C) are crimes of violence; Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence; Virginia kidnapping (allows deception) is not categorically a crime of violence — §924(c) convictions based on kidnapping vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Substantive reasonableness of fines | Defs: fines unreasonable | Gov: district court followed Guidelines and imposed below‑Guidelines fines | Court: fines ($5,000 each) not substantively unreasonable; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012) (standard and factors for anonymous jury review)
- Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (preponderance standard for co‑conspirator statement admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E))
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause protects against admission of testimonial out‑of‑court statements)
- Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (test for whether statements are testimonial—primary purpose)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (physical force includes force exerted indirectly)
- H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (relatedness and continuity requirements for RICO pattern)
- Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009) (association‑in‑fact enterprise requires purpose, relationships, and longevity)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (conspiracy liability under RICO when defendant agrees to pursue enterprise objectives)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (modified categorical approach; divisibility analysis)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (documents review under the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (924(c) residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)