United States v. Daniel Ka, 982 F.3d 219

Daniel Ka was on supervised release after a 2011 conviction for possessing a firearm in relation to drug trafficking; his release conditions required truthful answers to probation officers and prohibited new crimes and drug use.
After multiple positive drug tests, Ka met with probation officer Chelsey Padilla; during the meeting he admitted helping sell drugs, Padilla reviewed incriminating texts/photos, and Ka signed a written statement saying his admissions were voluntary.
Padilla petitioned to revoke Ka’s supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Ka moved to suppress his statements as violative of the Fifth Amendment, arguing the supervision condition triggered the penalty exception.
The district court denied suppression, found Ka in violation, and revoked supervised release, imposing prison time and additional supervision; Ka appealed.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that United States v. Riley controls: compelled self-incriminating statements may be used in supervised-release revocation proceedings under § 3583(e); the court declined to resolve whether the penalty exception applied.
Judge Gregory dissented, arguing Riley is undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Haymond and that supervised-release revocations can be part of the criminal prosecution, triggering Fifth Amendment protections.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether using Ka’s statements at a § 3583(e) revocation hearing violated the Fifth Amendment	Ka: supervision condition made invoking the privilege penalizing (penalty exception); statements were compelled	Gov’t: Riley governs — compelled statements may be used in supervised-release revocations; no Fifth Amendment bar	Affirmed — under Riley, Self-Incrimination Clause does not bar use of compelled statements in § 3583(e) revocation hearings
Whether Haymond abrogated Riley such that Riley no longer controls	Ka: Haymond shows supervised release can be part of the criminal prosecution and undermines Riley’s premise	Gov’t: Haymond was limited to § 3583(k) and did not disturb Riley’s holding about § 3583(e) revocations	Held Haymond does not abrogate Riley; Riley remains governing precedent
Whether the Fifth Amendment penalty exception applied here	Ka: the condition requiring truthful answers imposed a penalty for silence, making the privilege self-executing	Gov’t: unnecessary to resolve because Riley disposes of the claim; even assuming penalty exception, Riley permits use at revocation	Court declined to decide penalty-exception question and resolved the case on Riley precedent

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (probationer must invoke privilege; parole/probation revocations are not part of criminal prosecutions)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation due-process framework; not trial-stage protections)
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (describes the Fifth Amendment "penalty" exception)
United States v. Riley, 920 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2019) (held Fifth Amendment does not bar use of compelled statements in § 3583(e) supervised-release revocations)
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality & controlling concurrence held § 3583(k) unconstitutional; recognized supervised release can have features like sentencing)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (discusses supervised release as part of the final sentence)
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (sentencing is a critical stage implicating Fifth Amendment concerns)
United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2020) (post-Haymond treatment of supervised-release statutory provisions)