United States v. Dan Wallen, 874 F.3d 620

Wallen shot and killed three grizzly bears that had been reported as food-conditioned and habituated in his Montana neighborhood. He admitted shooting them but gave inconsistent accounts about distance, whether family members were present, and how many bears he initially shot.
He was charged under the Endangered Species Act for "taking" grizzly bears and tried by a magistrate judge over his objection to a bench trial; he was convicted after the judge found his self-defense claim not credible.
The magistrate applied an objective-reasonableness standard to the statute’s "good faith belief" self-defense defense and concluded Wallen’s belief was not objectively reasonable.
Wallen appealed, arguing entitlement to a jury trial, that the magistrate misapplied the self-defense element, and alternatively seeking a jury trial in the interest of justice on remand.
The Ninth Circuit held Wallen was not entitled to a jury trial, but concluded the district court erred by applying an objective standard to the § 1540(b)(3) "good faith belief" defense; the correct standard is subjective (but reasonableness may inform credibility).
Because the magistrate applied the wrong standard and that error was not harmless, the Ninth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for reconsideration under the subjective-good-faith standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to jury trial	Wallen: offense is "serious" (exposure to probation, restitution, §19) so Sixth Amendment jury right applies	Government: offense is presumptively petty (≤6 months); additional penalties don’t make it "serious"	Not entitled to jury trial; Clavette controls — penalties here do not transform the offense into a serious one
Proper standard for §1540(b)(3) "good faith belief" defense	Wallen: statute requires only a subjective good-faith belief that force was necessary	Government: defense requires an objectively reasonable belief (relying on cases construing other "good faith" defenses)	Court: defense is subjective; factfinder may consider objective reasonableness only to assess credibility
Harmlessness of legal error	Wallen: magistrate’s use of objective standard undermines conviction validity	Government: any error was harmless because magistrate found Wallen not credible and evidence supports conviction	Error not harmless; reasonable factfinder could find subjective belief of danger despite inconsistencies
Right to jury on remand due to judge’s knowledge of record	Wallen: judge knowing his conviction record would bias a bench retrial	Government: prior knowledge alone does not require jury; Liteky standard for judicial bias	Denied: prior knowledge of convictions does not entitle defendant to jury; bias requires deep-seated antagonism or favoritism

Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (presumption that offenses with max imprisonment ≤6 months are petty for Sixth Amendment jury right)
Clavette v. United States, 135 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.) (holding §1540 prosecutions for taking grizzly bears do not entitle defendant to jury trial)
Keiser v. United States, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.) (applied objective-reasonableness self-defense instruction under a different statute)
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.) (interpreting "good faith" as generally subjective in statutory contexts)
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (subjective good-faith beliefs can negate willfulness; objective unreasonableness affects credibility)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (statutory terms with settled common-law meaning are presumed to carry that meaning)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (Fourth Amendment good-faith exception adopts objective-reasonableness test)
United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir.) (jury may consider objective reasonableness when evaluating subjective-good-faith claims)