9 F.4th 440
7th Cir.2021Background
- Dameion Wyatt pleaded guilty to one count of interstate sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)) after victimizing multiple women from 2011–2014.
- The PSR and a same-day Addendum contained conflicting restitution requests (government initially sought ~$202,000; later reduced after negotiations) and defendant lodged detailed objections.
- At sentencing (Nov. 15, 2019) the district court deferred the restitution determination under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) and set a later hearing (Feb. 7, 2020). Wyatt was sentenced to 10 years.
- Procedural confusion followed: defense counsel temporarily lost docket notifications, counsel later reviewed and argued objections, moved to withdraw, and Wyatt filed several pro se submissions.
- On July 22, 2020 the district court issued a reasoned restitution order awarding $95,075 to three victims (AV-1: $12,750; AV-3: $45,200; AV-5: $37,125). Wyatt appealed raising four principal challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wyatt) | Defendant's Argument (Government/District Ct.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether restitution amount was "ascertainable" at sentencing so §3664(d)(5) delay was improper | Amount was ascertainable at sentencing (PSR said "None", victim non-response = renunciation, and underlying evidence existed pre-sentencing) so court lost jurisdiction to delay | PSR Addendum and parties’ disputes showed amount not ascertainable; court permissibly deferred under §3664(d)(5) | Affirmed: no plain error; restitution not ascertainable at sentencing and delay permitted |
| 2) Whether district court erred by relying on belated/insufficient evidence and failing to require a "complete accounting" | Court relied on untimely, untested hearsay/grand jury material and lacked a practicable complete accounting per §3664(a) and Rule 32(c) | Court relied on PSR, Addendum, agent declaration, and both parties’ submissions; materials were sufficient "to the extent practicable" and court exercised discretion | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; record sufficient and court fairly evaluated conflicts |
| 3) Whether Wyatt was deprived of counsel during restitution proceedings | After counsel moved to withdraw Wyatt was effectively unrepresented and entitled to new counsel or presumptive prejudice under Cronic | Defense counsel’s representation had substantially occurred; Sanders had developed and argued objections; pro se filings were considered; no total denial of counsel | Affirmed: no constitutional deprivation or reversible prejudice |
| 4) Whether restitution order entered outside Wyatt’s physical presence violated Rule 43 / §3553(c) / due process | Rule 43/§3553(c) require presence and open-court statement; awarding restitution outside presence (post-sentencing) violated rights | Only Rule 32(c) applies to restitution procedure per §3664; court complied with mandatory restitution statutes and §3553(c) in context | Affirmed: ordering restitution outside defendant’s physical presence was permissible under controlling law |
Key Cases Cited
- Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (addresses jurisdictional and timing aspects of post‑sentencing restitution).
- Stivers v. United States, 996 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2021) (explains that only Rule 32(c) applies to restitution proceedings under §3664).
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (standard for plain‑error review of sentencing issues).
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice when defendant wholly deprived of counsel).
- United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010) (MVRA prevents finding a victim renounced restitution absent a clear statement).
- United States v. Bogdanov, 863 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2017) (use of hearsay in restitution calculations is permissible).
- United States v. Havens, 424 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for restitution awards).
- Newman v. United States, 144 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1998) (discusses whether restitution is punitive versus remedial).