United States v. Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47

Dávila-Félix was convicted in 2009 by a federal jury of FDIC-insured bank robbery using force and intimidation and of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.
The district court sentenced him to life under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) and to 84 months for the weapons offense, with concurrent terms of supervised release.
The court also classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based on prior Puerto Rico convictions.
The government sought a life sentence under § 3559(c)(1) based on prior convictions; the district court relied on several violent offenses and drug offenses.
The First Circuit held the record insufficient to support a life sentence under § 3559(c)(1) and to treat the April 2004 convictions as qualifying predicates for the career offender enhancement.
The case is remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the instant offense can trigger a mandatory life sentence under § 3559(c)(1).	Dávila-Félix argues the third strike must follow the second strike’s conviction.	The government contends § 3559(c)(1)(B) requires sequential strikes.	Yes; the instant offense must be committed after the preceding conviction.
Whether the April 2004 convictions can be treated as a second strike under § 3559(c)(1).	April 2004 convictions should be the second strike only if sequentially after the first strike.	The government argues sequentiality applies to the second strike, not the instant offense.	No; April 2004 convictions cannot serve as a second strike under § 3559(c)(1) given the sequencing requirement.
Whether June 1993 and July 2000 Puerto Rico drug convictions qualify as serious drug offenses for § 3559(c)(1).	Convictions qualify as serious drug offenses if punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).	Puerto Rico statute lacks drug quantity; may not qualify as serious drug offenses.	They do not qualify as serious drug offenses for § 3559(c)(1).
Whether the career offender enhancement under § 4B1.1 was properly applied given the timing of the instant offense.	The two prior qualifying offenses must be before the instant offense.	The government contends the prior drug convictions may count as predicates.	The district court erred; the April 2004 conviction cannot count as a prior predicate, and the drug convictions do not satisfy the criteria.

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopts categorical approach for predicates)
United States v. Chartier, 933 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.1991) (requires two prior predicates before instant offense under career offender rule)
United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.1998) (statutory interpretation and sequencing in sentencing schemes)
United States v. Luna-Diaz, 222 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2000) (supports sequential interpretation of similar statutes)
United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34 (1st Cir.2006) (modified categorical approach in predicate analysis)
Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010) (consecutive § 924(c) sentence notwithstanding higher related minimum)