United States v. Díaz-Bermúdez
778 F.3d 309
1st Cir.2015Background
- Diaz-Bermudez pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)); two drug counts were indicted but later dismissed per the plea agreement.
- Police found two handguns (one loaded), three magazines, ammunition, >700 small bags of crack, 75 small bags of powder cocaine, and paraphernalia in a vehicle where Diaz was the sole passenger; he admitted ownership of the drugs and later admitted possession of the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.
- The written plea agreement was a hybrid: it required the government to move to dismiss the drug counts (Rule 11(c)(1)(A)) and recommended (non-binding) a 60-month sentence for the § 924(c) count (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)).
- At sentencing the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the drug counts but declined to follow the parties’ 60-month recommendation, imposing a 108-month sentence instead; Diaz appealed.
- Diaz sought to withdraw his plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5) after the court rejected the 60-month recommendation and separately argued the 108-month sentence was unreasonable (procedurally and substantively).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 11(c)(5) required the court to offer plea withdrawal when it rejected the 60‑month recommendation | The government (plaintiff) argued the court properly treated the agreement as hybrid and was not required to offer withdrawal because it accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(A) dismissal | Diaz argued Rule 11(c)(5) required an opportunity to withdraw because the plea contained a sentence recommendation the court rejected | Court held Rule 11(c)(5) did not apply; the 60‑month recommendation was non‑binding under Rule 11(c)(1)(B), and the court accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(A) dismissals, so no withdrawal right arose |
| Whether the 108‑month sentence was procedurally unreasonable for allegedly failing to consider § 3553(a) factors | Diaz argued the court failed to consider § 3553(a) and relied solely on disbelief of his claimed ignorance | Government asserted the court sufficiently considered § 3553(a), weighed criminal history and offense facts, and permissibly assessed Diaz’s sincerity | Court held no plain procedural error: the record shows the court considered § 3553(a) factors and legitimately questioned Diaz’s sincerity given his history and admissions |
| Whether the 108‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable (upward variance of 48 months) | Diaz argued the court gave insufficient justification for an 80% upward variance over the 60‑month guidelines sentence | Government argued the variance was supported by offense seriousness, quantity of drugs and guns, recidivism risk, probation status, prior convictions, and Diaz’s lack of remorse/sincerity | Court held on plain‑error review the upward variance was plausible and not indefensible given seriousness, criminal history, probation status, and statutory maximum; sentence affirmed |
| Standard of review applicable to sentencing objections not raised below | Diaz argued the court should apply abuse‑of‑discretion review | Government noted Diaz failed to preserve objections so plain‑error review applies | Court applied plain‑error review and required Diaz to show a reasonable probability of a different sentence absent the error; Diaz failed to meet that burden |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85 (1st Cir.) (plea-plea-record factual sourcing when defendant pleads guilty)
- United States v. Medinar-Villegas, 700 F.3d 580 (1st Cir.) (plain-error standard for unpreserved sentencing objections)
- United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171 (1st Cir.) (sentencing review framework: procedural then substantive reasonableness)
- United States v. Vega-Salgado, 769 F.3d 100 (1st Cir.) (weight given to an express statement that court considered § 3553(a))
- United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir.) (deference to district court’s assertion it considered sentencing factors)
- United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir.) (inference of a court’s reasoning by comparing parties’ arguments and the PSR)
- United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir.) (requirements for a plausible sentencing rationale and defensible result)
- United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.) (deference to district court on substantive reasonableness of sentence)